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West Europe Report



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29 August 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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PVDA'S VAN DEN BERG ON CRUISE MISSILES, COALITIONS

Amsterdam DE WAARHEID in Dutch 14 Jul 84 p 7

[Interview with Max van den Berg, president of the PvdA, by Frank van den Berg and Ronald van der Horst: "I Do Not See them Sailing up yet To Bring us Those Missiles"; date and place not given]

[Text] The PvdA [Labor Party] has started preparing itself for the Second Chamber elections to be held a year and a half from now. The party leadership published a red booklet with "socio-economic dilemmas," a first step toward an electoral program. And according to all kinds of recent articles in weekly magazines, the leadership and the parliamentary party are having heated arguments about it among themselves. In addition there is the problem of the cruise missiles. The PvdA is unconditionally opposed to them. But does it not with this position already put itself outside the game of government formation a year and a half from now? Or are the social democrats now finally going to really strive for a progressive majority in this country?

An interview with PvdA President Max van den Berg.

Question: What are the 1986 elections about as far as the PvdA is concerned?

Max van den Berg: That will be determined by the electoral congress of the PvdA, but we will always emphasize those themes which are most important for the future of this country and at the same time are most alive among the people. In my opinion they are: nuclear weapons; furthermore, the combination of an unjust social policy and the need to offer prospects again in the economic area: recovery of employment as well as selective economic growth and redistribution of labor. That is what is involved.

Question: Aren't these the elections in which the voters will decide whether cruise missiles will be deployed in the Netherlands? Joop den Uyl said it in January in VRIJ NEDERLAND: "During the 1986 elections the voters in the Netherlands will decide whether the cruise missiles will be deployed." And: following a decision to deploy, the Labor Party will immediately announce that a government with socialists will turn back that decision even before the missiles are deployed.

Van den Berg: I immediately said at the time that I could fully agree with those statements. Both of us, Den Uyl and I, have said it several times at congresses, and Den Uyl recently formulated it once again during the parliamentary debate on the government decision. The CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] will not be able to alter that. But they shouldn't think that they will easily get rid of us either when next a government is to be formed. Of course, we will only rule if the CDA and the VVD end up in the minority, because otherwise this coalition will simply continue. But if they get a minority and thus do have to negotiate with us, then they won't get an opportunity to say: the PvdA doesn't want any cruise missiles, so we can't negotiate with them. Wrong. They would then obviously have to accept the verdict of the voters, a majority of which would then have indicated that they don't want those missiles. But how you determine that, how you work that out...

Question: Den Uyl said: at the time of a government formation we must agree to renegotiate with the Americans. Assuming that those renegotiations don't succeed, would the PvdA then still leave the government when the treaty becomes operational and the missiles are really deployed?

Van den Berg: Directly. This was also the formula which came up at the time of the formation of the Van Agt II administration (footnote in the government agreement which stated that the PvdA ministers would leave if a decision were made to deploy -- editor). As to how this can be technically structured I will not comment on now. But the political question is: would it be possible one way or another for the PvdA in a government to share responsibility for deployment anyhow? And that is ruled out. The PvdA ministers will never do that.

Question: Still this is not completely an answer to the question: would it be possible for a government with the PvdA to exist in a country with cruise missiles?

Van den Berg: Didn't I just say that? Oh, no, wait a minute. You said: a government which deploys cruise missiles...?

Question: No, a government in a country with cruise missiles.

Van den Berg: Oh, yes, no. That is a whole new question. Let us assume that there has been a rightwing administration, we are past 1988 and there are cruise missiles; what do we do then? The PvdA will yet have to address this question at a later electoral congress. Then we will be a stage further. But my own position would then be, in the words of Neil Kinnock (English Labor leader -- editor): return to sender. And therefore I would also join an administration, to settle that.

Question: Let us repeat for the sake of clarity. Is this a conceivable series of events: next year a decision is made to deploy. The PvdA, like all other leftist parties would make this an issue in the elections. This leads to a coalition cabinet which includes the PvdA. This leads to negotiations with America to keep the missiles out anyhow in 1988. If those negotiations don't produce results, new elections will be held?

Van den Berg: No, that is too fast. In my opinion there will be no deployment then. If the other ministers of other parties then want to compel a deployment anyhow, then they will face a cabinet crisis. And usually there are new elections then.

Question: If this administration concludes a deployment treaty with the Americans, will it -- technically speaking -- really be terminable then? Is there anything left to renegotiate then or can the Americans continue to invoke it?

Van den Berg: It seems to me that national elections about such a subject count so heavily that an administration simply must respect the national democracy, must shape it. Regardless of any treaty, I don't see the Americans sailing up with their boats to bring those missiles according to the contract while meanwhile the administration is renegotiating. You can take quite a number of legal stands, but international treaties are also an expression of political consensus.

Meanwhile Van den Berg touched on a number of international elements of the nuclear arms race during the interview. He explained that he does indeed strongly hope that the Soviet Union will freeze and reduce the number of its SS-20's, as the government "demands" in the Dutch missiles decision.

But he expects real results rather from contacts with smaller countries. He noted the recent statements made by GDR leader Honecker in the Italian newspaper IL MESSAGGERO. Honecker claimed to be striving for an exchange of the Pershing missiles deployed in the FRG for the Soviet Union's response in the GDR, the SS-22 and SS-23.

It is striking that the Dutch government, which claims especially to want to exercise international influence, does not concern itself with such initiatives. Van den Berg does not find that striking at all.

"No, the Dutch government does not deal itself into that, does not deal itself into anything, because it has made a purely Dutch decision. The whole decision was directed solely toward the domestic security of this administration. Toward the continued existence of this coalition. This is why the story is so weak internationally speaking. It doesn't even mention those SS-22 and SS-23 missiles, only the SS-20's."

Question: Back to the Dutch elections because that is what this interview was about. Opinion polls predict that as soon as a real deployment decision has been made, the number of hard opponents to the cruise missiles will drop sharply. Specifically the number of opponents within CDA circles would then decline. The desire to stop the missiles anyhow would then be borne primarily by people who already vote progressive anyhow. If that is true, then the missile issue is not likely to help bring the right into a minority by the end of next year following the deployment decision.

Van den Berg: I don't know anything about those polls, but I can well imagine that effect. But I find that an extra inducement for the PvdA precisely to go on with it. This is not an opportunist argument or a nice point for the

elections. It is a conviction which has gradually been growing since 1970 within the PvdA, among its members, among its own rank and file. The "no" to the cruise missiles is an expression of that. To abandon that position would invite a break with our electorate comparable to what happened in the socio-economic field with the Health Insurance Act. And it would be right for the voters to say then: we are not going to pick that. Rightly. Therefore it will not happen.

Question: A multiple choice question. What is at stake in the coming elections: A: To put the CDA and the VVD in the minority; B: To put the left in the majority; or C: To bring the PvdA into the government?

Van den Berg: The first and the third. They are tied together. Point two could play a role in it in terms of the extent to which you support one another in this.

Question: A leftwing majority is not part of it?

Van den Berg: To work exclusively for a leftwing majority and to say that if we don't achieve that we won't govern, that seems unrealistic to me. And it seems to me like the wrong stake for these elections.

The PvdA should recruit both on the left and in the middle. And should never make a choice between them. If we really want to push the CDA and the VVD in the minority, then we must recruit over the whole front. With one marginal note. I have always been convinced that a PvdA which shifts its course in terms of political content in order to recruit more voters in the center, will irrevocably cause a break with its own traditional voters. Our first task lies with those traditional voters and from there you broaden your recruitment field. As PvdA you are there first of all for those with the lowest incomes or those who are socio-culturally most dependent. If you were to do it differently, you would get a large number of non-voters.

Question: Doesn't precisely the possibility of recruiting toward the center with really leftist issues in a leftist society loom up more and more these days? The old separation is decreasing. And issues such as nuclear arms, but also reduction of working hours and unemployment could cause breaches among the rightwing parties.

Van den Berg: There are obviously political notions with which you can recruit much more broadly than solely among the traditional voters of the PvdA. Otherwise we could never be that high in the opinion polls. After the war we traditionally got about a 25 percent share of the voters market, and now we are at 35 percent. In my opinion this is closely related to nuclear arms on the one hand, and to the feeling of social injustice on the other. The latter is even more important than the whole economic program we advocate, even though this in itself is determining for the question of whether you really have any prospects to offer.

Very simple notions -- such as: this administration considers that higher incomes need to be cut less than lower ones -- cut deeply in CDA circles. I have

also noticed that young people are figuring out that the VVD ideal of "stand up for yourself" becomes worn out if there is no government behind it to help. WAO [Law on Labor Disability] benefit recipients now also take a strong position against the VVD, which has shortchanged them 12 times already and which is now talking nonsense about wanting to spare WAO benefit recipients. Hence, a shift can be won in those circles. Therefore it is our business to keep those basic notions very clear.

Question: But keeping those notions pure and at the same time saying: we can only govern with the CDA or the VVD, doesn't that clash?

Van den Berg: No, those are the stakes. I have always shouted: if we do wake up with such a leftist majority on the day after the elections, then that will be a very interesting fact. But it makes a big difference whether you make that a stake.

Question: But what about the clash between pure principles and governing with the CDA or the VVD?

Van den Berg: There is no clash for me. It is characteristic of Dutch political culture as a whole that you always work with a coalition cabinet and that there are never clear majorities. This led to the fact that within cabinets -- and these were often broad cabinets, Roman catholic - red or even broader -- the differences among parties were often difficult to see. The only way to escape that in the Netherlands, as long as there are no changes in the electoral system, is to present those basic notions very clearly before the elections, and to ask for support from them. But at the same time to say honestly to the voters that you are willing to join the government, to negotiate and to make compromises. But you do have to call that which you agree upon with your opponent a compromise and show where you have given in. And also show what you keep fighting for. The parliamentary party in the Second Chamber must continue to tell the whole story and not fully concur with the administration's policy.

That is a clear story then. And then you haven't confused your holy ideal with the compromise you have had to make politically in the given situation. The political culture of the left often breaks down on the latter. That we feel so responsible for a compromise that we defend it as if it were the last and the best, as if we had invented it ourselves. The voters often feel tricked by that.

Hence, negotiations at the time of the formation will be tough and dependent on the support of the voters. In this we have only formulated one point in such a way that it is determined beforehand: there will be no cruise missiles with the PvdA. All the other points will become a question of compromise. And there you know very well where you overstep the mark as a party. Hence, if such an administration were to have greater cuts for the lower incomes than for the higher ones, then this would never be possible with the PvdA in the government.

Question: Hence, there is only one "controversial issue" for the PvdA left from the 1982 elections? What happened to the other issues such as the closing of nuclear power stations, and purchasing power for minimum incomes?

Van den Berg: I can think of a hundred controversial issues, just like that. I am not making any comments about the strategic concept which will be used; discussions are still going on about that. But my own opinion is that we should stick to this: put the right into a minority, and no cruise missiles with the PvdA. As far as the rest is concerned, we should simply put our own socio-economic program on the table and then start negotiating hard. That program should be broad and not deal solely with purchasing power.

Question: You have a chance of government cooperation with the CDA or the VVD; does it make any difference which of the two it is?

Van den Berg: That is six of one and half a dozen of the other. Although six is more than half a dozen.

Question: Hence also with the VVD?

Van den Berg: Yes, I must note objectively that in a number of locations in the country the experiences of PvdA council members with the CDA have been negative, specifically about meeting commitments. Whereas there were experiences with liberals where they got further with businesslike agreements, and where that which had been agreed on was carried out in any case.

Whether this can ultimately also be done at the national level will depend on the question of whether the liberal, businesslike political institution will be given room within the VVD. This is not true at the moment; a strong conservative institution currently dominates. Although I do find it businesslike also. The manner in which the VVD parliamentary party in the Second Chamber often tells the whole story and then makes compromises, appeals to me. Not Nijpel's style; that does not appeal to me at all; it does not have enough foundation in terms of content. But the fact that the VVD parliamentary party makes it clear that it does not agree with the whole cabinet policy, that they want more -- I find that a good style. That way the differences remain visible and the policy remains attractive.

Question: Hence there are two controversial issues: the right into the minority and the missiles.

Van den Berg: The question of social justice is a tough issue. I don't know yet how precisely we are going to have to do that. I am convinced that the elections will have to deal both with socio-economic questions, fair distribution, and with the cruise missiles. It is still far too early to know how to give form to that. That depends on what the unions do, what the situation is like in 1986.

Question: A rock-hard purchasing power guarantee for the minimum incomes?

Van den Berg: I know at least a dozen more of those. Higher incomes should be reduced more; minimum incomes should not be reduced more through a reduction of working hours, etcetera, right. All of that will be considered. A guarantee for "the" minimum incomes, that is too vague. Then you have to say: the situation of people who have to get along with a minimum allowance has

deteriorated enormously. Eight to 11 percent in recent years. If there is any economic growth you should plead for its recovery. Consequently, that is what the PvdA party leadership has done in its just published memorandum: "Socio-Economic Dilemmas."

And with a reduction of working hours, everybody's income will have to be reduced, but that is no longer possible for people who have to make do with a single minimum income and also have to support others. For them, you have to prevent their purchasing power from declining. If your prosperity growth is negative, then you have to make sure that the opportunities for spending -- that is an intentionally broad formulation -- remain steady.

Opportunities for spending involve both the amount of money you get in your hands and what you can buy with it, but also the price of government services, such as natural gas and housing, and the availability of public benefits. The left does well to handle that broad concept. It doesn't do the people any good if they receive the same amount of money but the libraries are eliminated or natural gas prices are raised terribly.

You must beware not to let those other fields slide, which are terribly important particularly to people with the lowest incomes, because of too one-sided a concentration on the money. You see that happening in the CDA: they try to arrange something for the minimum incomes while, in fact, the result is that they are caught through the back door.

I am very much inclined to say: we develop that program, we ask the voters to put the right in the minority; then they will have no other choice than to govern with us. Then you would have the certainty that there will be no missiles and that there will be a socially just program. That whole area involving a large number of rock-hard controversial issues (as with the previous elections -- editor), which in practice are given another wording anyhow, is too much of a shell game.

Question: Is it true that the PvdA parliamentary party considers your draft electoral program, your "dilemmas of a socio-economic policy," nothing but a wish list with things that cannot all be done anyhow?

Van den Berg: That is a misunderstanding. That may be true for individual members of the parliamentary party. The parliamentary party has also turned in proposals on all those issues, such as the alternative which they asked the Central Planning Office to calculate. Our social security proposals, for example, are completely tuned to the person who is primarily responsible for it within the parliamentary party, Elske ter Veld.

This document indicates the legitimate differences of opinion which exist within the PvdA. As leaders we have formulated our opinions, but also those of others within the party. I am not interested in having to listen privately to all kinds of people telling me that the party should be more realistic, while this is never argued clearly, openly and in terms of content in the debate within the PvdA. The whole party should be involved in that.

And to those who say: with this report you commit yourself far too early, I would say: we are not putting down any figures, but only choices and directions. The congress is the means to provide clarity.

First we were accused of not having enough reports and now we have too many of them. That is a fascinating development, indeed. As a matter of fact, the document that is being presented now is a document from the executive committee of the congress. And that is an authority which belongs only to the party leadership. At the same time, there are other opinions within the party; this is why they are included in this memorandum.

The only thing is that it is a serious misunderstanding to think that the separation line lies between the committee and the parliamentary party. That has come to the fore in a number of press publications. That does not agree with the facts. When I look at someone like Elske ter Veld, who has taken positions in the name of the parliamentary party during the past year concerning social security, then this fits much better with the choices in our memorandum than a number of things going around in draft form from members of parliament such as Van Kemenade and Woltgens. Thus there are also differences of opinion within the party committee. That occurs throughout the party. That is also a good thing. When the discussion takes place between the parliamentary party and the party leadership, then it is really more a question of prestige and not of content.

The draft electoral program will also come up for discussion in the progressive consultations with other leftist parties, because many of the dilemmas which are included are precisely also being discussed within each of the small leftwing parties. They struggle with the same contradictions.

Question: Are you excluding the possibility that now, with ample time before the elections, the progressive parties might reach certain program agreements, for example a plan to move toward a 25 hour work week?

Van den Berg: I feel that it is unwise to bring up those strategic formulas too early. I would prefer a thorough discussion now within the progressive consultations about a number of themes, as they appear in our document, and about ideas which other parties bring up. It is via content that you should arrive at a strategy.

Question: But what about a leftwing plan for a 25 hour work week, would the PvdA go along with it?

Van den Berg: It is just as with the previous elections. It is of course important to have the support of the small leftwing parties during and after the negotiations for a cabinet. But a program agreement, which would be very close to striving for a leftist majority, would be the wrong issue. The issue is: put the VVD and the CDA in the minority.

Whether, apart from that, it would be a good thing to compare our programs, to look at what we have in common in terms of salient points, that is another issue. Perhaps this might help clarify the elections. I would be an advocate of that myself. But quite a number of people within the PvdA and within the

party leadership look at it with skepticism. Those are people who feel that in practice it all remains a question of words and doesn't achieve much. Because, after all, everyone knows very well that you will support one another after the elections if it really comes to crucial issues.

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LANC DEFENDS FOREIGN POLICY, FOREIGN TRADE, SECURITY POLICY

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 28/29 July 84 p 5

[Article by Erwin Lanc: "There Can Be No Question of 'Neutrality'"]

[Text] Austria's foreign policy has suddenly come under fire, Moscow is warning against giving in to the "Reagan course," in the United States the long smoldering conflict about the undesirable transfer of high technology to the East is coming into the open, Vienna's neutrality is being depicted as that of a "mercenary." East-West tension, created in no small measure after Helsinki by Moscow's secret arms buildup, events in Poland and Afghanistan, are now becoming more noticeable in Vienna's "blind spot." The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which has just celebrated its 25th birthday as an independent department, is working at full capacity in spite of the vacation season. The Minister for Foreign Affairs comments in this article, rejecting all accusations of "creeping neutrality" and stressing continuity.

The same thing does not have the same effect under altered circumstances, on the other hand something else can achieve the same result. Everything that holds generally true for making a decision and carrying out the subsequent action under changing conditions, as the result of a dynamic process, has particular significance for Austria's foreign policy. Simply imitating what has proved to be successful previously is even more out of the question than in other political areas. The declaration in the statement to parliament by the chancellor, Dr Fred Sinowatz, about "the continuation of active neutrality" adheres to this dictate completely:

"In changing conditions, Austria's foreign policy must continue to do justice to the task of guaranteeing the independence and autonomy of the republic and of making its contribution to the economic prosperity of its people. On the foundation of the national treaty and of perpetual neutrality, our concern is to continue an active policy of neutrality which guarantees people a peaceful existence and assures them of the benefits of international cooperation."

That is a clear affirmation of the previous tenets of Austrian foreign policy, at the same time being an expression of continuity while simultaneously taking into consideration dynamic changes in conditions, to which Austrian foreign policy must adapt. Any attempt to want to squeeze all world-political developments and Austria's possible reactions into the rigid framework of a "doctrine" would be conservative in the bad sense, that is to say unrealistic.

In the first year of Sinowatz's government, we were successful in developing foreign policy dynamically, that is to say, pursuing the same line under changing conditions. In the daily polemics of policy this was depicted by the opposition as a change and applauded as a "shift in course" in order to create a basis for justifying their own shift in course toward a greater community in foreign policy; some obviously equally conservative critics, on the other hand, are decrying the supposed continuation of the gradual decline in the Austrian foreign policy of neutrality into mere neutralism, into equidistance between the political blocs.

In the military area I could not imagine what else should determine our neutrality except the same distance to both military alliances. Politically we have and in the future we will judge the actions of others--whether they are aligned or nonaligned nations--and will determine our own actions, in accordance with the rules that apply to our social structure, in accordance with our chartered and empirical understanding of democracy and in accordance with international law.

Distances in the political realm are measured exclusively from an Austrian standpoint. The majority of the results will show greater distances to single-party states than to genuine parliamentary democracies. But it is not only a single party state that is capable of violating international law. Unfortunately, democracies are also capable of this. In such cases it is not Austria that determines the distance, but the violator of international law. Above and beyond that, the determination of a violation of the law says nothing about its severity. For this reason, every UN statistic on voting behavior is worth it to--admittedly--a lot of people as a method of exerting influence since it is not weighted.

Anyone who supports the view that Austria should pursue a policy which at best reflects its neutrality is not a neutralist, not one who maintains equidistance, but someone who views the definable range of behavior that conforms to neutrality as an essential part, but only one part of an overall foreign policy that must orient itself by human rights and the political and economic interests of the citizens of the country. In this area there is certainly so much material for discussion that setting up neutralist papier-mache friends could easily be dispensed with.

Since one rightly feels somewhat weak in the ideological discussion about neutrality, behavior in national defense which conforms to neutrality is often put in doubt in order to distill ideological weakness out of it again. The political leadership of Austria is often reproached with neglecting national defense with the--justified--reference to the fact that in accordance with the neutrality law in the constitution Austria has to defend its perpetual

neutrality with all the means at its disposal. It is said that we ourselves cannot establish the norms here. The prevailing doctrine of international law rather requires a contribution comparable to that of other neutrals, which preserves our own neutrality even with military means. So Austria's expenditures for national defense are compared with those of Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and--ignoring the difference between neutral and nonaligned--Yugoslavia in proportion to the gross national product. Austria has the lowest percentage of military expenditures for national defense--so this is at least an enormous mess-up in neutrality! Then more ministers come and point out the difference in Austria's geopolitical situation from that of Switzerland and Sweden and they cap everything with--apparent--incompetence.

It is not considered worth mentioning that Switzerland and Sweden, neutral in two world wars, are indisputably wealthier in spite of our catching up economically, although that is the basic element of the "means at its disposal." There is no comment on the fact that Sweden also spends almost 1 percent more of its GNP than Switzerland for national defense. The geographical components, the size of the land area and the air space, coastal defense in Sweden's case, are politely ignored. But most of all, the core of the problem is not grasped. In Switzerland--on the assumption that there is nothing to fear from the NATO alliance that surrounds it--based on an air defense that was started a long time ago and built up over a long time, it is possible to strengthen the air force and believe that they can successfully defend their air space. In Sweden the possibilities and necessities of defending their air space are not at all comparable with continental Europe--the sea borders surpass the land borders, to mention only one component. Scandinavia is an important flank area for the pact's systems, but it does not have a central function.

Air Space? We Are Doing What We Can

No neutral country lies so directly //between// [in italics] an enormous concentration of military means of power of all categories in both military alliances as does Austria. Quite apart from the question of its meaningfulness, funds cannot be demanded from it, as being at its disposal, which would have to exceed what other neutral countries spend; in all military areas, including air defense.

This was recognized in the mid-1970's. The plan for national defense, drawn up and approved by all three parliamentary parties, was consequently based on reality: on a plan for air surveillance which was acceptable financially, militarily and in terms of foreign policy. It required an instrument for detection in the form of radar surveillance ("Golden Bonnet") and replacing flight equipment, primarily for air surveillance and secondarily to support the ground units of our army.

It was an unfortunate step to describe this flight equipment as "interceptor fighters," because the impression arose in broad circles of the population that "interception" also means "bringing down." After detecting and identifying strange aircraft, this can only be the extreme case, not the normal one. The concept was chosen largely incorrectly, and the political debate about

about the purchase of air surveillance aircraft with ground combat support roles has been going in the wrong direction for some considerable time.

A plan for air surveillance that is almost 10 years old is naturally also not sacrosanct. Like all other areas of national defense, not only the military, the measures that have been taken or are planned have to be adapted to the dynamics of technical and economic development. It is just as legitimate to want more than was decided upon. One principle must remain unshakable: any decision about maintaining the sovereignty of Austria must be made by the sovereign, the Austrian people, not by an outsider. Not even if he considers us militarily too weak according to his own military-strategic estimate.

The past year in particular has provided an opportunity to sketch the contours of the natural important areas in Austria's foreign policy. Our good relationship with all our neighbors was expanded not only by mutual visits, but by a new dimension in cooperation across national borders: environmental policy. In addition to close cooperation with Switzerland and the FRG within the EEC, discussions began with the FRG and Yugoslavia about cooperation in the event of nuclear accidents, and, above all, a treaty on this subject was concluded with the CSSR as the first of its kind and ratified by both countries. To this may be added the environmental agreement with Hungary.

Once upon a time at least the edge of the powder keg of Europe, the region around us has become and remained a zone of peace under the difficult conditions of East-West relations. Individual problems are discussed openly with all our neighbors and gradually solved. Overall a result that--given the varying social structures of our neighbors, historical burdens and the fact that aligned nations of both pacts, neutral countries and nonaligned countries are involved--would have been unachievable without detente.

Two facts determined the involvement of the government in European politics in this one year: the disappearance of the last customs barriers in the European Free Trade Association of the 17 on 1 January 1984 and the efforts of the EFTA countries not to be pushed out of the market of which they were previously an integral part. Not the change in the Austrian exchange rate, but the dynamics within the EEC--as in the early 1970's--have brought European policy more strongly into the awareness of the Austrian public.

A recognition of the new difficulties had to be achieved not only in Austria and the other EFTA nations, but in the EEC as well. Our warning against a possible tripartite division of Europe seemed initially perhaps exaggerated to many. But in many governments of the Community it was a genuinely thought-provoking and contributed to creating the awareness that the EEC alone was not Europe. In conjunction with the difficulties that occurred at the beginning of 1984 with cross-border highway freight traffic--at the borders between EEC and EFTA nations--the conditions existed for discussing and deciding upon what the EEC and the nations of EFTA had in common.

With the joint communique from Luxembourg none of the plans established in it for more intensive cooperation between the EEC and EFTA has been put into practice. However, it was possible to reach agreement about the method of

negotiation in the few weeks since then; the preparations which have already begun concerning the content point to a start of negotiations in September.

The EFTA summit which was held in Visby in May not only confirmed the Luxembourg resolutions but, with the resolution to advance the round of GATT talks in Tokyo on reducing customs, a clear decision was reached in the direction of free world trade and against protectionism.

Last year the greatest speculation concerned Austrian policy on the Middle East. Quite apart from the attempts of many circles in Israel to divide the members of the new Austrian parliament into friends and foes of their country, speculation was primarily centered on the departure of the man who had shaped Austrian policy in the Middle East, Dr Bruno Kreisky, from his public functions; as if the policy of a country--however important the persons representing it are--were not primarily an expression of its vital interests and fundamental political concepts. It is not a question of liking or disliking Israel determining Austria's Middle East policy but supporting the basic rights of the Palestinian people which have been denied so far by Israel. Accordingly, last summer at the ILO Austria voted in favor of an Arab draft resolution which condemned the social and economic effects of the Israeli settlement policy in West Jordan and the Gaza strip, after the language that discriminated against Israel in Austria's view had been eliminated.

For the same reason Austria participated in the UN Geneva conference on Palestine and put forward the same principles from 1979 at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York: the right of the state of Israel to exist within safe, internationally recognized borders, but at the same time the right of the Palestinian people to self determination and their own state. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its consequences have temporarily diverted the interest of the world public from the core of the Middle East problem, the question of Palestine. But it is in the deepest interest of Austria and beyond that of Europe that this conflict zone is transformed into a peace zone through a just and therefore lasting settlement of the legitimate claims of the peoples living there. Current conditions there are certainly not the most favorable. The potential partners in a discussion--even if it is for different reasons--are currently not in a position to discuss or negotiate. The thrust of Austrian policy is to gather the information and opinions necessary to seize any initiatives that promise success, once the partners in the conflict have gained more latitude to move.

This objective was promoted by visits to five Persian Gulf states and to Egypt, as well by cultivating bilateral relationships. The same objective is being pursued through Austria's uninterrupted attempts to assist in creating conditions which will assist in the exchange of prisoners between Israel and the PLO or its individual splinter groups. The humanitarian aspect is the primary one here, but it should not be forgotten that humanitarian actions of this kind presuppose a minimum of mutual trust, which have a positive effect in the future when they are successfully concluded.

It would be impermissible to see relationships between Austria and the Arab states only from the perspective of their conflict with Israel. Expressed in

a simplified way, most Arab states have what Europe needs and need what Europe has. Austria's economic contacts with the Arab world have today reached a measure that not only reflects outstanding and friendly relations, but also meets the economic needs of both partners. Arab participation in the construction and operation of an Austrian conference center cannot be viewed primarily from the perspective of financing, rather it symbolizes Austria's special role and opens up opportunities for these relationships for the future. Those who were not exactly troubled by farsightedness in evaluating our Middle East policy in the past are unwilling to recognize this.

For all the importance of the self-established priority areas in Austrian foreign policy that have been mentioned and also in those that were not mentioned--such as continuity in our South Tirol policy while simultaneously strengthening our relationships with our neighbor Italy--the preservation of policy represents the non-negotiable condition for any foreign policy for the neutral countries of Central Europe. Consequently, in October 1983 the government appealed to the superpowers not to break off the disarmament talks on medium-range missiles and those on intercontinental missiles in Geneva. This accounts for Austrian efforts to safeguard the Stockholm Conference for Measures to Create Trust and Security in Europe (KVAE) at the foreign minister level and to press for a resumption of the discussions on troop reductions in Vienna.

"Always on the Ball"--to Ensure Peace

We must succeed in bringing the dialogue on disarmament out of the political-declamatory realm back into the realm of genuine negotiation on disarmament, including the prevention of a further arms buildup. This applies both to nuclear weapons and to conventional weapons, to chemical weapons and to the inclusion of space for armaments. The Austrian initiative at the United Nations to objectify information about relative military strengths is crippled because the Warsaw Pact is not cooperating. A halt in nuclear weapons--the only "self-controlling" method to prevent the further development of nuclear weapons--is rejected by practically all nations that possess nuclear weapons.

All attempts not to include space completely in the arms buildup have so far come to naught on the objections of the United States. For this reason the newest Soviet proposal for discussions and the basically positive American reaction are gratifying. The ability to fire at intercontinental ballistic missiles from space does not automatically signify protection for those at whom they are being directed, but a disturbing of what used to be called the "balance of terror." There can be no successful arms limitation without some regard for this balance, because then fear washes away the trust that still remains and can lead to incalculable reactions.

The positive attitude to the talks on the part of the superpowers who are supposed to stop the tightening of the armament screw--in space as well now--cannot be altered by the fact that, except for the Soviet Union, all the other countries that possess vulnerable rockets of this kind naturally are not interested in systems which can eliminate the efficacy of their deterrent weapons.

It should be known that the Soviet proposal and its acceptance by the United States came about at a time when the House of Representatives made approval of requested budgetary funds for an expanded antisatellite system dependent on a 1-year moratorium on tests involving this type of weapons--on condition that the Soviet Union adheres to the test moratorium it announced last year. Even the U.S. Senate is demanding proof from the administration of efforts to enter into serious negotiations as a condition for approving funds.

To dismiss all this as tactics would be wrong. We must take advantage of whatever led to this opportunity.

Until now Austria has only been an observer at disarmament negotiations at the UN conference on disarmament in Geneva (CD). The Stockholm KVAE, even if it was only on the periphery of the difficulties involved, opened the way to participation with full rights. The matter at hand--both in Stockholm and in Vienna--was to create the staffing conditions which will ensure information, analysis and an appropriate decision about Austria's position in questions concerning measures to create trust and security as well as disarmament. This is not a hobby for conference diplomats but a condition for the preservation of all that Austrians have created for themselves during the last four centuries.

9581

CSO: 3620/401

HARDLINE COMMUNISTS REACT TO ELECTIONS, EXIT FROM CABINET

New Offensive

Paris LE COMMUNISTE in French 29 Jul 84 p 1

[Article by Jacques Alain: "New Plan of Action for a New Offensive"]

[Text] The Communist Liaison Committee is making an active contribution in reconstructing the working-class party in France.

To this effect, its objective is to contribute to strengthening the communist trend against reformism, class collaboration and anti-sovietism.

It sees itself as an integral part of the international revolutionary and working-class movement and is working for the triumph of communism in France and in the world.

French politics just passed a turning point. By setting up a new plan of action for a new offensive.

Considering the European elections, which have eroded the government's credibility, the proposed referendum and the cabinet reshuffle are means used to change the political setup. This, among other things, made possible the departure of the ministers belonging to the PCF. The bourgeoisie would rather do without them for the time being; that way, it can be more open to the opposition. Just read Fabius's appointment speech and you will be convinced: "it is our opponents' turn to speak," "proposed collaboration in some ministries," etc. Clearly, they are looking for a political plan of action that would bring unity to the government, create a respite among the various trends in the bourgeoisie so that all could aid, support and safeguard the offensive about to be taken with a new set of measures that will affect all classes of society, and tighten the workers' belt so much that they will have no choice but to fight back as hard as possible.

As for the PCF, it has its place in this plan of action. While in the cabinet, its ministers were bound by government solidarity which prevented them from

abstaining or voting against. Therefore, the party also did not have any elbow room to intensify struggles and take advantage of them, to be more critical of the government, and let it hope that it could to some extent recover from the snubs it is receiving with each successive election.

The bourgeoisie, for its part, believes that now that the PCF is no longer in the government it will use its reformist, nationalistic and election policy to channel future struggles toward objectives that do not challenge the capitalist regime. It has already selected the niche from which the PCF is supposed to play the parliamentary and constitutional games.

Either this strategy will work, or it will not; in that case, in the name of alternation, the opposition could take over and carry out the same policy of hitting the exploited classes; to the sole benefit of capitalism, that goes without saying.

Unless workers become aware that they have their say, that they must engage in a general political struggle against the capitalistic system and all those who support it. It is the role of all true communists to fight for the latter alternative.

Communist Liaison Committee Statement

Paris LE COMMUNISTE in French 29 Jul 84 p 7

[Statement of the Communist Liaison Committee: "For a National Conference of Reconstruction Forces"]

[Text] In its 1 July 1984 issue, LE COMMUNISTE reproduced articles showing that, following the European elections, analyses and conclusions made within the communist movement in our country concurred, and concurred also with those of the CLC [Communist Liaison Committee].

The campaign to boycott these elections, which was carried out separately on similar themes, therefore led to nearly identical observations and to calls for the reconstruction of the Communist Party.

In its special mid-July 1984 issue, the BULLETIN DU COMITE DE LIAISON COMMUNISTE reproduced an article published by the Southeast Communist Roundup and entitled: "No Reconstruction of the Communist Party Without Communist Practice." Today, we are reproducing below a text from the Committee for the Reconstruction of the Communist Party [CRPC] entitled: "Reconstruction of the Communist Party in the Context of the Class Struggle." Again, we observe concerns identical to those of the CLC: the attempt to find practical ways of reconstruction in the light of experience.

Generally speaking, these communist groups or roundups follow the same orientations as the CLC (against Atlantic Europe; for solidarity with the socialist bloc; against the government's policy of poverty and unemployment; for workers' power; against racism; for class solidarity; against opportunism and reformism; for the socialist revolution, etc.). They are using similar methods (tracts

and posters placed in neighborhoods, on the street, at demonstrations; demonstrations within demonstrations, public meetings, etc.)

There is much to be gained by comparing our experience and trying to set up common structures.

In a first stage, this could be done by preparing and organizing a national conference of forces working for the reconstruction of the Communist Party.

Committee for PCF Reconstruction

Paris LE COMMUNISTE in French 29 Jul 84 p 7

[Excerpts from the keynote speech of the general meeting of the CRPC, on 14 July 1984, as published in LA BARRICADE DU 13e, a departmental monthly published by the Committee for the Reconstruction of the Communist Party: "Reconstruction of the Communist Party in the Context of the Class Struggle"]

[Text] It is true that a communist party is indispensable to carry to completion the working-class struggle, but that does not mean that the thousands of militants who are confused by the PCF policy will gather spontaneously. Nor does it mean that the party will be forged again through mere debates among communist groups. The reconstruction of the party does not come before anticapitalistic action. Which implies that, during the present stage, militantism will be reduced to the mere denunciation of the government's policy.

For that reason, we are convinced that no ready-made solutions can be found in books, not even in Lenin's works. On the other hand, we should consider the creation of the October party and remember the need for a structured, centralized and disciplined party, and especially the fact that a party will be forged in the struggle against the exploitation regime and against opportunism in the workers' movement. As for the rate at which to proceed, it is a function of the progress of the class struggle. Then, one thing is certain: the reconstruction of the Communist Party will require our intervention in the class struggle, or it will not take place.

Our task is not to spend our time saying or writing: "The PCF did not do this... It should have done that." We must continue to work along the lines that led to the creation of our Committee on 28 May 1983: open political avenues, fight under our own banner, that of communism, wherever we are represented (factory, neighborhood, union, mass association, etc.). Any other line of action will end up in rhetorical discussions or be no more than a laboratory experiment.

In the light of the political and militant relations established in December 1983 with our comrades of the Southeast Communist Roundup, especially through the communist campaign against Atlantic Europe, we can conclude that the reconstruction of the party will depend on our ability--as organized communist militants--to find answers to the issues now being raised by workers.

DRAPEAU ROUGE for Revolution

Paris LE COMMUNISTE in French 29 Jul 84 p 8

[Article published in the bulletin of the Communist Action Groups, LE DRAPEAU ROUGE, No 44 July 1984: "Against Capitalism, its Government and Its Allies: Only One Solution, Revolution; Anticapitalistic Program and Revolutionary Action"]

[Text] The militant groups which constitute the GRAC [Communist Action Groups] do not find their ideas reflected in the struggle for the reconstruction of the Communist Party. The following texts, published in LE DRAPEAU ROUGE of Marseilles and in L'ETOILE ROUGE of Nice give an idea of their positions.

Yet, in threatened sectors (steelmaking, shipbuilding, chemicals, automobile, etc.), workers feel the need for a grassroots union movement, an open confrontation of classes at national level. "A new May 1986, but a better one!" is what we often hear.

And workers may well interpret the PCF refusal to stay in the government as an order to start the fight. Quite possibly, such a nearly spontaneous movement could soon go beyond the boundaries within which the government and the reformists would like to contain it.

But obviously no matter how powerful it could be, such a movement would be defeated or soon exhausted unless an anticapitalistic revolutionary action program were adopted by the organized workers.

A battle (and a revolutionary victory) on the political line and on the subject of working-class leaders should start before the movement is launched or simultaneously with its launching. The CGT is our main asset in this frontline battle. Its goal must be to sideline all CGT officials who have supported and are still supporting the government and the left.

Politically, the main orientations of the program are simple:

- Unity of action of all the victims of capitalism: workers, office workers as well as small farmers, merchants and craftsmen, etc.
- Elimination of capitalism and expropriation (without indemnification!) of all large property owners (land, stock, buildings).
- Management of firms by the people and national planning.
- Abolition of the Fifth Republic.
- Adoption of a people's constitution ensuring the political hegemony of the working class and its allies.

- Abolition of colonialism.
- Withdrawal of France from international capitalistic institutions (European Economic Community, International Monetary Fund, etc.)
- Withdrawal of France from the Atlantic Alliance and struggle against all imperialistic war plans.
- Withdrawal of French imperialistic troops from third countries.
- Organization of the people's defense and police against its capitalistic enemies at home and abroad.

This program is the program that will lead to the ultimate victory of anti-capitalistic forces. Thousands of workers must adopt it, progressively.

The struggle will be long. Provisional objectives should be set: putting an end to austerity, to the "junking" of our industries, raising the masses' awareness of the noxiousness of capitalism, of the racism it produces, of the strength which the working class possesses when it is organized (class consciousness).

For this long and exacting task, workers need structures entirely independent from the bourgeoisie (right-wing and left-wing). They must give free rein to their imagination and revolutionary creativity while retaining the necessary cohesion: they need revolutionary centralism and democracy. This is why the creation of the Communist Action Groups reflects a need of the workers, is a necessity for the working class.

No one but Communist Action Groups seasoned in theory and in practice, acting in coordination but fully responsible for communist action in their geographic or professional area, can force revolutionary ideas deep into the masses and make it possible for these ideas to become the victorious force that will lead France to communism. Tomorrow.

L'ETOILE ROUGE Calling

Paris LE COMMUNISTE in French 29 Jul 84 p 9

[Article published in the bulletin of the Communist Action Groups, L'ETOILE ROUGE, No 8, July 1984: "Why Communist Action Groups?"]

[Text] What Should We Do?

As we can see day after day, salvation will not come from the left, nor from the right, nor from what is usually called the extreme right or the extreme left, for all these trends are interested one way or the other in the survival of capitalism.

What we must do, is fight unrelentingly those who organize the deterioration of our living and working conditions, and the economic system they represent and defend.

Is there an alternative to the communist struggle against the Mitterrand-Mauroy government, against our opponents, capitalists of all types, employers and politicians? No. On the other hand, there is a true alternative to their system.

What Alternative?

Rejecting the capitalistic system also implies that, at the same time, we aspire to live better, in dignified living conditions, to be able to work, and to have free education and health care...

Such a society does exist on earth: it is true socialism, when the economic and political power is in the hands of the working class and working farmers and the (socialist) system is managed by and for the workers.

For us, there is no other alternative but an undivided struggle for the advent of true socialism in France.

It is to achieve this historical prospect that Communist Action Groups were created.

The Role of Communist Action Groups

This march to socialism will not occur spontaneously. It must be organized, it must be led. To fight the capitalistic system, we must give ourselves efficient tools, independent from the institutions already created by capitalism. We cannot fight capitalism if it holds us prisoner in the organizations it has created or in those that have joined it.

In former times, the organization of the working class was the responsibility of the PCF. But today, this party has become a reformist party (i.e. it subordinates all its activities to some minor changes, without ever challenging the very causes of the evils from which we suffer) and joins others (Socialist Party, etc.) to manage the capitalistic system.

The Communist Action Groups are the structures that the working class needs to play an effective part, together with all those involved in the struggle against capitalism, against unemployment, against the deterioration of living conditions in cities and elsewhere, against racism, against the deterioration of the school system, against steadily rising prices, etc., with the goal of getting rid of capitalism once and for all.

The communist policy is not to substitute itself to unions for day-to-day action, it is to open revolutionary prospects for the workers' struggle.

Join a Communist Action Group or create one in your city, in your factory, in your neighborhood!

Disseminate L'ETOILE ROUGE, propagate it!

DUHAMEL EXAMINES POSSIBILITY OF SENATE RADICALIZATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Jun 84 pp 1, 7

[Article by Olivier Duhamel, professor of constitutional law]

[Text] Three years after the Left came to power, its defeat in the European elections is leading to new questionings by the opposition in the Senate. Should the Senate's traditional role as a chamber for reflection and reorientation be continued? Should the Senate be led in a new direction as a chamber for systematic obstruction and opposition?

The choice between those two strategies and those two conceptions of the Senate's role will unquestionably weigh heavily on the options of radicalization and re-centering that face our rulers.

Four elements explain the emergence of a trend in favor of radicalizing the Senate.

1. The new political situation. The Left turned out to be very much in the minority on the evening of 17 June 1984. Even better from the opposition's point of view, the electoral balance of power now seems to coincide with the balance of power in the Senate: there are 24 Communist senators (8 percent) out of a total of 317, plus 68 Socialists (22 percent).

In the Senate, the Left in the strict sense amounts to scarcely a third of the total. Among the voters, the Left in the strict sense won scarcely a third of the votes in the European elections. It is understandable that the opposition in the Senate, after being out of step following the wave of 1981, should now be feeling that it is in renewed harmony with the voters and drawing a sense of added legitimacy from that fact.

2. Institutional means of action. It is true that the Senate's powers are limited: it cannot vote the government out of office, and it cannot prevent the majority power (president, government, and National Assembly) from carrying out legislative reforms against its will. But the Senate remains an active component of Parliament. And as such, it has weapons at its disposal for modifying legislative and therefore political rhythms.

The importance to the government of being in control of the time element is well known. For example, Francois Mitterrand might currently be wanting to put the press law or the dispute over schools behind him. But if the upper Chamber decides to be obstructive,* an interminable special session may ensue, thus postponing the passage to a new political phase for as long as that session lasts.

3. The development of constitutional ideology concerning the opposition also forms the basis for a systematic senatorial blockade. The days when General De Gaulle wanted to reduce the Senate's powers are over. The liberal Right, upset by the shock of 1981, is now attached to the idea of strengthening those powers.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing has already declared that all the reforms adopted since 1981 without the Senate's consent should be reexamined, and he is proposing that bicameralism become strictly egalitarian in all matters concerned with freedoms.

4. Historical reminiscences are reinforcing that desire for more power. The Senate under the Third Republic was able to force the resignation of Leon Bourgeois in 1896, of Edouard Herriot in 1925, and of Leon Blum in June 1937.

And when the Left attacked the Senate in its first draft constitution, it was rebuffed by the people in the referendum of 5 May 1946. General De Gaulle suffered the same disappointment on 27 April 1969. The only two referendums ever to be defeated in our history concerned two proposed reforms attacking the upper Chamber.

A hardline Senate would therefore have grounds for undertaking total confrontation with the government. But those in favor of continuing the Senate's traditional role have no lack of opposing arguments in the very interest of their institution.

Who Expresses National Will?

The four factors that might lead the upper Chamber into systematic opposition are actually more relative than they appear at first glance.

1. The Senate's representativeness is out of phase. The claims to embody democratic legitimacy are limited in any case by the fact that senators are elected by indirect suffrage. But beyond that permanent fact, the European elections of 17 June did not result in strict correspondence between senatorial representation and the new electoral balance of power.

The dominant feature of the results of 17 June is the success of the extreme Right, which is not represented in the Senate. In that sense, no organ of the state can claim to embody this latest expression of universal suffrage--which, for that matter, was not national in purpose anyway from the constitutional standpoint.

* See the article by Anne Chaussebourg in LE MONDE, 23 June 1984.

2. The Senate does not express the national will. Under the Fifth Republic, only elections for the National Assembly and the president of the republic are governmental in nature--that is, intended to appoint governments. Article 20 of the Constitution does say that the government "is responsible to Parliament," but it immediately specifies that that responsibility is "in accordance with the procedures stipulated in articles 49 and 50." Those procedures stipulate that "the prime minister is empowered to seek the Senate's approval for a statement of general policy" (article 49-4) and that in any case, only the National Assembly has constitutional means for forcing the government to resign.

It is true that the Senate can refuse to approve bills that it does not like. But in no case can it attempt to force the resignation of a government it does not like. "The National Assembly, especially with its current political makeup, in which a single political group constitutes the majority, represents the will expressed by the majority of the nation. It indicates the path that is to be followed.... For its part, the Senate does not play that role." The person who said that was not Louis Mermaz, but Alain Poher, who in those words repeated on 23 December 1981 what he had already said in March 1972, thus demonstrating that his concept of the Senate still stood, regardless of whether the majority of deputies were Gaullist or Socialist.

3. The Senate contributes to Parliament's creative work. Specifying the Senate's role over against the majority will as expressed by the National Assembly, Alain Poher went on to say: "In the face of such a will, it is the Senate's role to study it, analyze it, compare it both with tradition and with the point of view of local communities and national minorities, refine its form, and thus contribute to the enrichment of Parliament's creative work."

That moderate concept of the Senate's role--concerned more with legislation than strictly with politics--has borne fruit. From 1958 to 1981, 97 percent of the 2,121 laws adopted were passed with the Senate's approval. And since the Left came to power, about three out of four laws have also been adopted with the agreement of both Chambers. It is true that those figures include the approval of international agreements, which in most cases are technical and cannot be amended. But in the case of more political texts, there is another indicator that reveals the Senate's usefulness.

When the two Chambers disagree, the government can call together a joint committee (CMP) on which both Chambers are represented equally: seven deputies and seven senators. Since 1981, the government has given the last word to the National Assembly in two out of three cases, but this still means that one-third of the texts were adopted as drawn up by a CMP. And independently of the statistics, the senators sometimes win important amendments to bills submitted by the government (the Quilliot Law is one example) or even win government support for one of their bills (this has just happened with the establishment of a threshold of 5 percent for representation in the Corsican Assembly).

In other words, if the Senate wants to really participate in exercising the legislative function, it must advocate reasonable cooperation with the government.

4. The lessons of history. Must we take up the hatchet of bicameralism? The Third Republic was born when Gambetta persuaded the republicans to accept the Senate (in return for which the monarchists accepted the republic). The Fourth Republic was born when Communists and Socialists resigned themselves to the existence of a second Chamber. The Fifth Republic was consolidated when the Gaullist defeat in 1969 tempered the Gaullist triumph of 1962, thus enabling the Senate to join in parliamentary action on a lasting basis.

Everyone is obviously free to hope for more or fewer powers for the Senate and to dream or not dream of a modification to the way it is recruited. But regardless of those debates, when Alain Poher pleaded at the end of 1981 against "the spirit of systematic opposition" and "partisan obstinacy," he was rejecting the exacerbation of bipolar confrontation and thus, probably, giving the Senate its consensual reason for existence.

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PCF ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, RAPID ACTION FORCE

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French May 84 pp 32-39

[Article by Louis Baillot, member of the central committee of the PCF, deputy to the European Assembly]

[Text] The election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage on 17 June 1984 has been used as a pretext to boost the campaign for European defense.

In an interview with the QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in June 1983, Simone Veil, who did not at that time know she would be heading a single slate from the right in these elections, said: "I am convinced that European defense will be one of the major issues of the coming campaign (for the European elections)."

Since then, she has on several occasions come back to the same subject, as have other leaders of the French right, such as Jacques Chirac, V. Giscard d'Estaing, and other UDF [French Democratic Union] and RPR [Rally for the Republic] leaders.

"Flight Toward the Future"

In fact, the concept of European defense has never really been abandoned by the right, either by the French or the European right. Only questions of political timing caused them to put more or less emphasis on an issue that had been in the forefront of politics in the early 1950s. It had taken France, led by the communists and Gaullists, to forcefully say "no" to the CED [European Defense Community], before the project was put back on the shelf, to await better days.

Throughout the 5 years of the first term of the European Assembly elected by universal suffrage, on several occasions the European right, acting at the initiative of French deputies such as Messrs d'Ormesson or Diligent, or of a British conservative

like Fergusson, brought the issue up once again, using a variety of pretexts, such as protecting the EEC countries' supply routes for energy and raw materials, or the organization of European arms production, and once more advocated a European defense system.

A few weeks before the end of that first term, a reactionary from the FRG, the Christian Democrat Klepsch, has just gotten a report passed in Strasboug, supported by the majority on the right, including the RPR and UDF deputies. The report contains all the worst features of this issue.

For the European right, ever since the days of Robert Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi and others, the idea of organizing European defense within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance has always been a major objective, so they could oppose the rise of European democratic forces. Today this idea has come back to the forefront, at a time when the European Economic Community has met with failure after failure, if we use as a point of reference the Treaty of Rome which set some major economic, social, and cultural ambitions for this community.

Recently, during a DAN [Defense, Army, Nation] meeting attended by representatives of the four major French political groups, Mr Moisi, a member of the board of directors of the highly official IFRI [French International Relations Institute], declared that the renewed interest in European defense was to some extent a "flight toward the future," because of the failure of the European Defense Community.

In support of his argument, he recalled that in the opposite case, in 1954 after the failure of the CED, the advocates of an integrated Europe proposed the EEC as a "flight toward the future."

This is indeed the impression we get now from all the debates in Strasbourg.

Last fall, the majority on the right, backed by a certain number of deputies from the left, approved the proposed formation of a European Union, which would give to the ten-member European Community, until the entry of Spain and Portugal, the rights of a sovereign state. Along the same lines, Giscard d'Estaing has again brought up his idea of the election of a European president by universal suffrage, a job he thinks would be just right for him.

So the EEC's failure has now led to this flight toward this institutional and military future, which poses an extremely

serious danger for sovereign states and their peoples. Fortunately for all concerned, "there's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip," and the experience we have had in economic and social matters shows that contradictions between states, further inflamed by the serious structural crisis which capitalism is now undergoing--consider in particular Great Britain's attitude--have created still more obstacles blocking the way toward a federalist and supranational Europe. Still, we have to take the threat of establishing a European defense system seriously, for this concept seems to be taking precedence over the idea of a European political union.

For the French and European Right: European Defense Hitched to the United States

For promoting this idea of European defense, all methods seem to be good, even if they are often in contradiction. But there is no doubt that it is the concept of a defense system independent of the existing blocs, a sort of third force, a third bloc, between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, which is most frequently used. The reasons for this are quite simple.

The advocates of such a defense plan are aware of the realities in France. Since 1966, at the decision of General de Gaulle, approved by the communist deputies during the debate in Parliament, France has no longer been a member of the integrated military organization in the Atlantic Alliance, though it is still a member of the Alliance itself.

Since that time, all our chiefs of state have supported this decision, even though, for one of them--V. Giscard d'Estaing--the battle of the front in 1976, conducted in full agreement with NATO, was intended to bring our country, de facto, back into the integrated military organization. Only a strong campaign in which the PCF played an important role forced Giscard d'Estaing to back down from this position, at least verbally.

Today, the majority of public opinion still does not support France's return to the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance. That is why the leaders of the right, especially the UDF leaders, who are the strongest supporters of the Atlantic Alliance and the most vocal advocates of a supranational Europe, are treading softly.

But what is the reality of this situation? Are we truly moving toward an independent European defense, toward the establishment of a third European bloc? Everything proves the contrary to be true.

Giving every Atlantic Alliance member his due, President Reagan has clearly stated that the United States would remain in Europe: "The United States' commitment to the defense of Europe remains unshakeable. In fact, we have taken, and we will continue to take, the steps necessary to strengthen this defense."*

Though we don't intend to repeat all the statements made by leaders of the EEC countries, let's quote a few of them:

Mr van den Brock, the Netherlands' minister of foreign affairs: "Europe could play a larger role in security policy, but only as a partner of the United States, and within the NATO framework. The Netherlands does not support the creation of alternative structures, such as a Nuclear Europe or a European "bloc" inside NATO."** The minister feels that Kissinger's idea of turning the NATO military command over to a European should be rejected.

In an interview with LE POINT, Great Britain's defense minister made the following remarks:

"Question: But, going beyond industrial cooperation, can we move toward a really European defense?

Answer: Great Britain feels that NATO is the most important safeguard of European security. So there is no question of its being really reconsidered in any way.

Question: Though for you, NATO may remain the essential cornerstone of Europe's security, what do you think of its American detractors, in particular of Henry Kissinger's recent statements calling for a reorganization of the Atlantic system?

Answer: Those feelings are understandable from the American point of view, but they are totally unacceptable to us, as Europeans. For example, appointing a European commander in chief as head of the allied forces, instead of an American general, would be taking the first step toward a split. The Americans would then feel much less strongly committed to Europe; while for us Europeans, the problem is precisely a matter of keeping this American commitment intact."***

* Interview with LE MONDE, 21 March 1984.

** Statement reported in LES NOUVELLES ATLANTIQUES, no 1612, 4 April 1984.

*** Interview with LE POINT, 2 April 1984.

Then Chancellor Kohl, while agreeing to discuss security problems with France, clearly stated that the FRG's defense is based above all on the United States, with which West Germany intends to strengthen its military ties.

All these statements prove that the French president was right, when he said in The Hague on 7 February 1984, during his visit to the Netherlands:

"In the current state of affairs, Europe is split between the security that presently exists and the security it hopes for. There is no doubt that it will choose what it already has. The Atlantic Alliance is not at all close to being supplanted by a European Alliance. That is because there is no military force capable of replacing the United States' arsenal. France, in any event, will not use its nuclear capabilities except for its own deterrence strategy, and Europe as a whole will not run the risk of being caught off guard... But France has not concealed from its allies that outside of protecting its own national sanctuary and the vital interests attached to it, it can not assume responsibility for European security. For strategic reasons and for reasons of international policy ensuing from these reasons, the decision to use French nuclear weapons can not be shared."

So at no time have the European leaders considered an independent defense. On the contrary, by approving the Klepsch Report on 11 April 1984, the reactionary majority in the European Assembly, carrying along in their wake the social democrats, who are always hung up on their anti-Sovietism, hoped to strengthen ties with the United States to a degree never before avowed: "It is not possible to conceive that the defense of West Europe can be assured outside of the framework of the Alliance or without the ACTIVE commitment (emphasis added by the author, L.B.) by the United States, of the 350,000 soldiers stationed in Europe and the deployment of its nuclear missiles."

But the author of this report goes even beyond this in subordinating Europe to the United States, saying that it would be wise to consider "including the United States within European political cooperation, as is the case with countries which have applied for membership in the European communities."

He also proposes consulting the United States before meetings related to European political cooperation, "which would give them an opportunity to influence discussions and decisions."

So there are the conditions in which the leaders of the French right, from both the RPR and the UDF, while doing everything

they can to advance their cause, are helping to spread the idea that European defense would in reality serve to strengthen the Atlantic bloc, particularly by giving the FRG the possibility of access to nuclear weapons.

Those on the right who babble about splitting the United States and Europe--the installation of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles, presented as a means of reestablishing the ratio of strength in Europe in relation to the SS 20 missiles, is designed to bind Europe to the United States a little more tightly--like those who speak of the "leaky American nuclear umbrella" that might no longer protect Europe--while it is in fact a matter of spreading the idea of a war limited to Europe, either a nuclear war (Reagan's statement) or a conventional war (Rogers' statement)--are deceiving the public.

Last November during a televised interview on Antenne 2, the president of France explained that European defense was inconceivable without European power.

Aware of the handicap entailed by the lack of any such power, the proponents of European defense have erected technical and political constructions in order to try to win this decision.

So now the UDF, Simone Veil, Jacques Chirac, and some of the ideologues from the so-called second left--such as Duverger or LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR--whose essential characteristic is their anticommunism, are all proposing a European Defense Council or Secretariat, with a board of directors limited to the three major European powers (the FRG, Great Britain, and France), which would somehow impose their decisions on the other members of the Community.

This clearly shows that the desire to set up this European defense system is firmly rooted in the French right, as it is in the European right. By strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, it would heat up the arms race once again.

Instead of moving toward a dissolution of the two blocs as the 23 June 1981 statement of the French Communist Party and the Socialist Party called for, we would be moving toward a strengthening of the two blocs, thus heightening east-west tensions.

The establishment of a European defense system in the present state of affairs, given the motivations of its advocates, would amount to turning our backs on a policy of peace and disarmament. That is the reality, a reality from which the proponents of a supranational Europe, with defense as one of its prerogatives, can not escape.

What Strategy Lies Behind the Use of the FAR?

In France, as well as in Europe and the United States, the advocates of European defense are pleased with the French decision to establish an FAR [Rapid Action Force]. They view this force as a military means of more closely involving France in the defense of Europe, and even as a possibility for reintegration--without actually saying so--in the integrated military organization of the Atlantic Alliance.

The most outspoken of these people have even written that the FAR was to some extent a resumption of the battle of the front under another form. And at the same time, those who feared that the FAR might challenge the concept of French nuclear deterrence have advanced their arguments.

Michel Jobert, writing in *MIDI LIBRE* on 1 February 1984, said: "Let's go even further: this Rapid Action Force--which can be used 'to plug up a hole, to punch a nose, or to show that we can be integrated in the Alliance,' to use the words of the socialist deputy from the Nièvre, Jacques Huyghes des Etages--negates the principle of deterrence, which is so important to the president of France. There is a triple logic behind this military force:

- a. It is interventionist, overseas as well as in Europe.
- b. It does require the construction of high performance French arms, but it ignores the principle of French deterrence: a nuclear weapon as advanced as possible, sufficiently well protected so that the chief of state will have time to evaluate the threat and to respond to it.
- c. It is part of the new American 'air land battle' doctrine. Like a modern version of light cavalry, the FAR would strike at the rear of a heavy Soviet force sent to the center of Europe, wave after wave."

Even last year, a few days before the debate in Parliament on the programming law, General Lacaze, army chief of staff, pointed out in a lecture given at the IHEDN [Institute for High National Defense Studies] the difficulties created by the FAR in relation to nuclear deterrence: "This question (of the defense of Europe) lies at the heart of the debate, for some people feel that there is a contradiction in wanting, with the same system of forces, to be able both to fight within the

Alliance, and also to be able to conduct a close-in defense of our own borders, in a national context... Resolving the dilemma--participation in the Alliance and defense of our territory--is a difficult exercise."

Moreover, during the parliamentary debates on the military programming law deciding on the creation of the FAR, Charles Hernu, minister of defense, in order to answer questions and soothe fears, said: "The FAR, an essential element of this re-organization, may be used to meet our commitments to our allies, if the French government so decides. For this independent force is obviously not to be placed under NATO control. Projecting this force forward does not mean that France accepts the principle of automatic engagement in a battle on the front lines, but rather that it would agree to intervene, as a means of deterrence, in a crisis situation in order to defuse that situation and to keep it from degenerating into a conflict."

With its 47,000 men and materiel such as its anti-tank helicopters, the FAR is a military tool that in itself has no precise [moral] significance. Aesop might have said of it that it could be the best or the worst of things.

So it is actually the strategic significance of its use that is the subject of the present controversies, and the reason for questioning on the part of people who refuse to believe that nuclear deterrence might be outmoded because of the use of other strategies.

Preventing the Militarization of Space

The decision the American president has made to involve the United States in a sort of "Star Wars" is already being considered as the signal announcing the end of nuclear deterrence.

What does this "Star Wars" consist of? It is the use of space to establish an anti-nuclear missiles system.

In the middle of the 1970s, by mutual agreement the Americans and Soviets decided to renounce the use of anti-missile missiles which require complex development at an extraordinarily high cost. In addition, both powers were then engaged in the SALT II strategic arms limitation talks, covering arms capable of striking the adversary's territory. These negotiations culminated in the Vienna 1978 Brezhnev-Carter meeting. But the agreement was never ratified by the U.S. Congress, as the most reactionary and most chauvinistic groups in the United States rejected the concept of strategic parity with the USSR, and demanded military supremacy.

Since that time, Reagan's heating up of the arms race in order to regain this supremacy and the success of the U.S. Space Shuttle have led the American president to involve his country in a "Star Wars" scenario. Artificial satellites equipped with laser-type weapons would be able to intercept Soviet intercontinental missiles as close as possible to their departure base. This decision by the U.S. president is contrary to the commitments made by both parties not to use space for military purposes.

Of course, the use of these space weapons will not happen tomorrow. The most optimistic forecasts talk about the year 2000, as both the scientific and technological problems to be worked out are quite complex. In addition, the program is extremely expensive, with no certainty of 100 percent reliability. What would be the use of developing such a system if some of the strategic nuclear missiles sent in very great numbers were to slip through the meshes of the net, and hit the very territory that they were supposed to be defending?

Despite the uncertainties still hovering over these "Star Wars" weapons, the militarization of space, which would be a considerable stride forward in the arms race, should be stopped right now.

During Francois Mitterrand's trip to the Netherlands, he mentioned the possibility of Europe taking part in the conquest of space: "Europe should be capable of placing a manned station in space, enabling us to observe, transmit, and thus to block any eventual threat; this would be taking a great step forward toward our own defense. We can not overlook the progress made in computers and in artificial memories, as well as the already known capability of firing projectiles that travel at the speed of light. In my opinion, a European Space Community would be the best way to meet the military realities facing us tomorrow."

It is quite difficult to say just what the French president's precise intentions were in making this comment. But perhaps we should see in his statement, made as acting president of the EEC Council, an intention to establish a major scientific and technological goal for Europe, in order to help Europe make up some of its lag in space behind the United States and the USSR.

That is what Georges Marchais assumed, when he said, speaking at the Hotel Lutetia last February:

"On the subject of European cooperation to develop a manned satellite, first of all, why be against that? We support cooperation in research, studies, and industrial developments. We

think that Ariane, like the Airbus, just to stay in the area of space, are the results of excellent cooperation programs. We support scientific and technical progress. We are all for bold technological developments."

But right now, this prospect of a "Star Wars" has led the advocates of European defense to say that nuclear deterrence is too old-fashioned, and consequently, to prepare for a conventional war, which would make use of highly sophisticated weapons, including the neutron bomb. Last year the UDF leader, Mr Pinton, created a stir by saying that nuclear deterrence should be classed with World War II's Maginot Line. And since that time, the statements and reports repeating the same idea have grown by leaps and bounds.

Really, the U.S. imperialists and all those acting in their interests, including their partisans in France, have not resigned themselves to peace, to detente, to disarmament on the basis of military and strategic parity. All of them are preparing for war, no matter what kind of war, hoping to find in such a war a way to resolve the structural crisis undermining the capitalist system and above all, a possibility of striking a fatal blow against the socialist system, and particularly against the USSR.

Independence and Sovereignty of France

Georges Marchais clearly defined the PCF's attitude on European defense during the Assembly-Debate at the Hotel Lutetia.

Recalling what he had told the 24th Congress of the PCF, he said: "We defend and we will continue to defend in an unyielding manner the independence and sovereignty of France. In the current international context, by shouldering the responsibilities which proceed from its alliances, France can preserve its full capacity for action in all circumstances. It can reject any alignment. It can make its own voice heard, and take all positive initiatives in harmony with its views. It is this position of principle which led us yesterday to reject the idea of a European defense community. And it is what leads us today to reject the concept of European defense being promoted by Simone Veil and Jacques Chirac. Naturally, I can understand why the RPR and UDF, which dream only of binding France inside a supranational Europe tightly subjugated to the United States, would want to move rapidly ahead on this course. But such a plan, which would give the Federal Republic of Germany access to

nuclear weapons, would be dangerous for the cause of peace. It would constitute a serious challenge to the independence and security of our country."

This clear opposition to any European defense was confirmed in the National Council session of the PCF held last March, convened because of the upcoming European elections. And in Nice, the general secretariat of the Party cited as a fourth objective for the current election campaign: "the independence and security of France. This is an essential issue, to which we are as strongly attached as we are to our own arms and legs. France must have total and sovereign control of its defense capabilities, and must have mastery of its deterrent force. At the same time, it can take effective action so that Europe will unite its forces in actions for peace and disarmament."

According to the communists, France's military defense should be based on an all-azimuth nuclear deterrence policy and on popular deterrence: that means the existence of an army based on conscription, which alone is capable of ensuring this close link between the army and the nation, and alone is capable of providing a true national defense.

If it is to be credible, nuclear deterrence must be maintained in good condition. That is why we have consistently advocated the development of military materiel capable of serving this role of deterrence. In 1978 we supported the construction of a sixth nuclear submarine which the then president, Giscard d'Estaing, wanted to put off to a later date. Our position was derived from the general staff's evaluation, which said that the credibility of nuclear deterrence required the existence of six nuclear submarines, so that we could always have three at sea. Based on the same concept, we approved the construction of a seventh nuclear submarine, which will replace the first one when it becomes obsolete.

Popular deterrence is the use of a form of defense whose origins date back to the "mass uprisings" of the Great Revolution, whose principle Jean Jaures defined in his book, THE NEW ARMY. Obviously, during the past three-quarters of a century, evolutions and revolutions in all senses of the term have taken place, and it would be absurd to ignore that fact. However, the heart of Jaures' thought still remains valid: there is no, and there can be no national defense unless the people take an active part in it.

But the defense of France is not only military. It must be part of a great external policy of peace, disarmament, cooperation, and friendship between all peoples. The more remote the

dangers of war become, the more peace will endure and grow stronger, and the more our country's defense will be ensured. So, contrary to the still too stubbornly held view, there is no contradiction between an active peace policy and the organization of a true national defense, so long as international conditions do not enable us to do without it.

While the Communist Party is opposed to any European defense plan, it actively supports all European security policies. For the future of Europe is not to be found in the strengthening of blocs, in the arms race, in the creation of new military systems, but rather in peace, detente, and disarmament.

In Helsinki in 1975 all the countries of Europe, along with the United States and Canada, 35 nations in all, signed the charter called the Helsinki agreement.

The creation of the CSCE [Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe] was to help us to advance along this course. Now a Conference on Disarmament in Europe is meeting in Stockholm, convened by the "35" during the Madrid session of the CSCE last fall. This conference has set as its objective the creation of a climate of confidence between east and west, so that a gradual and balanced disarmament could begin, enabling each nation to provide for its security.

For the great issue of the present day, the one which rightly concerns all peoples, is indeed disarmament. To do everything to begin the process of disarmament, even to take the slightest step toward it, is a matter of extreme importance. For that reason the communists are working with all their strength, and with all people of good will, no matter who they may be or where they may come from.

Today two concepts are clashing in Europe. One is the concept of tension and aggressiveness, one component of which is European defense. The other is the concept of collective European security, for which the foundations have already been laid. That is the concept which we must work to make prevail.

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ASSEMBLY APPROVES LAW ON NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 3-9 Aug 84 pp 2-3

[Article by Fernando Antunes]

[Text] Unnoticed by most citizens, at dawn on 27 July and "apace with" the Law on Internal Security, the Assembly of the Republic, in a final total vote, approved the Information System of the Portuguese Republic. Changes made in the initial proposal improved it substantially: Now, for example, the agents and reporters in the PIDE [International and State Defense Police]-DGS [Security Directorate General] and in the Legion cannot belong to the services, an impediment that was not included in the original text.

Those disqualifications are now stipulated, without any room for doubt, in the extensively revised and amended text of the government proposal which has created the Information System of the Portuguese Republic. As everyone knows, the proposal was approved in general, but in particular, a temporary commission set up in the area of the National Defense and Constitutional Affairs Commissions introduced into it several "legal commands" and a formal perfectionism that would require improvement in many of the regulations flawed by too much ambiguity and even some unconstitutional aspects. Specifically curtailed were certain "expanded" concepts which had made the Information Service far more "police-like."

The final total voting on that important draft law went almost unnoticed, at dawn on 27 July, precisely because it coincided with the more heated discussion into which the final phase of the debates on the Internal Security Law had turned; a phase which included the by now well-known sudden turns of events that occurred at the time of the voting.

Magistrates Commission To Investigate Irregularities

One of the innovations approved is closely linked with the text of the Law on Internal Security, in the section relating to data centers. This entire matter is transferred to the Information Service, which will be able to have data centers compatible with the nature of the service, which will be responsible for processing and keeping in magnetic files the data and information collected in the area of its activity. However, no data center can be created except by decree-law, so as to allow the Parliament to be convoked to ratify

it. Moreover, the formation of an inspecting commission consisting of three magistrates, members of the Public Ministry appointed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, has been introduced.

The Magistrates Commission will operate without interfering in the authority inherent in the National Commission for Data Protection. The inspection will be carried out through periodic checks of the programs, data and reports taken by sampling and provided without a nominal reference.

When in the course of a judicial or administrative process errors occur in the attribution of data or reports (or irregularity in the processing thereof), the processing unit will be required to notify the Magistrates Commission of the fact. Based on another one of the innovations made in the original proposal, anyone who, through an action of any officials or agents of the Information Services (or in the course of a judicial or administrative process), learns about data concerning him which he regards as erroneous, which have been obtained improperly or which violate his rights, freedoms and personal guarantees, may without precluding other legal guarantees, require the Magistrates Commission to undertake the necessary checking and to order the nullification or correction thereof.

A Commission of Three Citizens Elected by Parliament

Officials and agents, both civilian and military, of the Information Services are expressly forbidden to undertake the detention of any individual or to bring criminal suits; and they are also prohibited from engaging in activities within the area of the specific jurisdiction of the courts. Access to the data and reports must be authorized by a communication from the competent member of the government, and the use thereof for purposes other than the preservation of democratic legality or the prevention and suppression of crime is banned.

The control of the Information Services will be ensured by an Inspection Council elected by the Assembly of the Republic, without precluding the inspectional powers of the latter organ of sovereignty according to the terms of the Constitution. The existence of parliamentary control was one of the most controversial issues in the general debate. The initial proposal called for a parliamentary commission elected on the basis of patterns that did not uphold the principle of proportionality among the different parties. Hence, it would have been immediately considered unconstitutional.

The alternate solution, now established, mentions three citizens of acknowledged suitability, elected by the Assembly of the Republic, through a secret vote and a two thirds majority of the deputies present, and no less than a majority of the deputies actually serving in office. Whereas the initial proposal restricted the powers of the Chamber, the text voted on at dawn on 27 July retains those powers and extends them beyond Parliament, making the formation of that Council contingent on an internal election process.

The election of the members of the Inspection Council is nominal and valid for a period of 4 years, and may be interrupted only at the behest of the Assembly of the Republic.

A new organ has been added to the body of the system: the Technical Commission, which is responsible for technically coordinating the activity of the services, based on the instructions coming from the Higher Information Council. It is a permanent advisory organ of the council itself, which is in turn the inter-ministerial organ for consultation and coordination in the field of information. This council is chaired by the prime minister, and has a rather extensive membership.

In addition to the Inspection Council, the structure of the Information Service includes the aforementioned Higher Information Council, the Technical Commission (which was not contained in the original proposal and thus has a role similar to that of a General Directorate), the Strategic Defense Information Service, the Military Information Service and the Security Information Service. The first comes under the prime minister, who can delegate his authority to another member of the government (he could not do this previously). The Strategic Defense Information Service comes under the prime minister, who can also delegate his authority to another member of the government. The Military Information Service comes under the minister of national defense, through the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, with the respective coordination incumbent on the Council of Chiefs of Staff. And the Security Information Service, finally, comes under the minister of internal administration.

Eliminating the Concept of 'Indirect Strategies'

Another major innovation is the one which obliges the prime minister to inform the president of the republic regarding matters associated with the direction of the Information Services' activity (previously, there had been a vague mention of directing policy). Moreover, the concept and purposes of the Information System, as well as the area of activity of the Strategic Defense Information Service, have been restricted and demarcated. For example, the strategic concept of national defense has been "shot down," as has the principle of indirect strategies (which Mota Pinto wanted to be covered by the action of the Defense Service). Defined as "indirect strategies" would be a situation wherein there was supposedly "an attempt to start up the intentions and plans of the USSR through the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party]."

The operation of these services does not come directly under the defense minister either, but rather the prime minister; while the Military Information Service is subordinate to the head of the Defense Ministry and not, as was desired in the initial version, the military chiefs. The Security Information Service comes under the minister of internal administration, and the area of its activity is also heavily restricted. Terms such as the defense of "democratic legality" and "state security" have been excluded.

The Blackmailers...

Blackmail is a harmful practice and as such is reprehensible. The initial version was flawed by complete omission, leaving a completely free rein for transgressors. Sottomayor Carida (Jorge Lacao is also the author of many of the changes made in that place and others) upheld the application of aggravated

and accessory penalties for the perpetrators of crimes involving personal damage. In this way, anyone who, by violating his legal obligations or abusing his office, is convicted of a crime stipulated and punished in the Penal Code against the honor or privacy of citizens will receive the maximum aggravated penalty applicable, with a third of its minimum and maximum limits. An official or agent convicted of having committed a crime of fraud may be given in the court's sentence, when the circumstances of the concrete case have been weighed, the accessory penalty of dismissal or suspension from the discharge of his duties up to 3 years. Will this suffice to discourage blackmail?

The bill on the Information Service will still go through several procedural phases before being sent to the president of the republic for purposes of promulgation, a formality that will not take place before the first half of August. In the final total vote, the parties' positions were as follows: PS [Socialist Party], PSD [Social Democratic Party] and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] voted in favor; PCP, MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission], UEDS [Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy] and the deputy of "the Greens" voted against; and ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association] abstained.

How the Government's Eyes and Ears Will Operate

Organs	Functions	Establishment and Subordination
Inspection Council	Control of the Information Services without precluding the Assembly of the Republic's inspection powers	Three citizens elected by two thirds of the deputies
Higher Information Council	Interministerial organ for consultation and coordination	The prime minister is the chairman
Technical Commission	Advisory organ of the Higher Council	Directors of the Strategic Defense Information and Security Information Services, chief of the EMGFA Information Division and secretary general
Strategic Defense Information Service	Produces the necessary information to guarantee the national independence and external security of the Portuguese State	Subordinate to the prime minister who can delegate
Military Information Service	Comprised of departments charged with producing military information necessary for fulfillment of the Armed Forces' missions, including the guarantee of military security	Subordinate to the defense minister, through the CEMGFA

Security Information Service	Produces reports designed to guarantee internal security and necessary to prevent sabotage, terrorism and espionage and the commission of acts which, by their nature, could upset or destroy the constitutionally established state of law	Subordinate to the minister of internal administration
Data Center	Responsible for processing and preserving in a magnetic file the data and reports received in the area of its activity	The inspection is done by a commission of three magistrates

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AZOREAN ELECTIONS TO ADD LUSTER TO MOTA AMARAL'S PR CANDIDACY

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 2 Aug 84 p 4

[Excerpts] The politicians have not forgotten him in their subconscious: Mota Amaral is like the mysterious figure concerning whom no one knows what he would be capable of doing if faced with the national demand that he contribute to the nation at a time of external crisis, as an image of national salvation; but he is, and there can be no doubt of this, a figure commanding respect, necessitating constant watchfulness on the part of his most direct opponents.

Mota Amaral's passiveness, interrupted at intervals so as not to detract from initiatives destabilizing the system, will soon become a participatory attack, primarily on the structures of his party.

In fact, there is every indication that Mota Amaral will force the PDS [Social Democratic Party] to take a stand before the year's end on the party's candidate for the presidential elections; and with this position, he will also force the party into a clearcut definition of who is leading whom. And he will do this immediately after the regional elections next October, taking advantage of another victory, which will not elude him, to send a message to his party, telling it that continuing to withstand the attrition in the command, without detriment, and remaining steadfast in the Azorean galaxy are not occurring fortuitously, since so much could happen here now, and later on the continent.

It is this aura of Mota Amaral's which is unparalleled on the continent within his party. And so, after 14 October, he will reappear with redoubled forces and with an image capable of obscuring anyone who might try to oppose him within the party. And it is there that he will appear (at whatever cost to anyone) as PSD's possible candidate for the presidency of the republic.

Mario Soares and Mota Amaral are now among the few Portuguese who might have a chance of success in the presidential elections. The rivalry between the two could be a herculean struggle. And the claims of good relations and better understanding that the two governors have published on specific occasions will be left behind.

CDS Declining, PCP Rising

Perhaps to avoid capitalization that would not benefit anyone, Soares' announced visit to the Azores ended up being postponed until after the elections. Possibly because Mota Amaral now thinks that, at that time, when he has emerged victorious from another election, it will be easier for him to dim the image of Mario Soares. But Soares will be here to claim that, in the Azores too, PS [Socialist Party] is the party with regularity; because it will certainly be the one that has fewer losses in percentage terms, something that will enable it to proclaim victory in its fashion.

We are not attempting to do anything here but translate what has constituted a concern of Azorean politicians there: For now, the regional legislative elections and, following them, and taking advantage of them, as a guide, devising the guideline for the presidential elections.

If we accept the fact that abstentionism will harm PSD primarily, PS will have to keep the same electorate and the fluctuations will be reflected in the loss of the position that CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] has in the Regional Assembly; while PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] will perhaps succeed in achieving its long, cherished dream of putting a deputy in the Azorean Parliament.

This reasoning has its logic, dictated by the change in the electorate's behavior; and it is reinforced by the fact that, in the Socialist Party, despite the differences that exist, those heading the list in Angra and Ponta Delgada are already known. In PC, there has also been an announcement already of the name of its leader representing the main Azorean population group. PSD itself has now allowed a leaking of the first ones on the lists for Ponta Delgada and Horta; whereas, on the CDS side, nothing is known yet, which is not surprising if we consider the great confusion among the Azorean Centrists, with three command fronts, none of which has yet reached the conclusion as to who is really in command.

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PRP'S CARLOS ANTUNES: NO ARMED STRUGGLE

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 2 Aug 84 p 14

[Report on interview with Carlos Antunes, founder of the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat, by Nuno Soares, in Lisbon, date not specified]

[Excerpts] "I have been a professional politician going on 28 years now, ever since I was 18. I started out in the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], where I remained until 1968. I left the party because of programmatic, strategic and ideological differences. It is a great story, but it is not worth going into now." Carlos Antunes, aged 48, the founder of the PRP [Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat], is a serene, calm, deliberate man. He is sitting with me at a table at the Versailles coffee shop in Lisbon. Silva Graca, the Communist deputy who has fallen into disgrace, has also sought out the fresh air of the Versailles, where we are having our conversation.

Carlos Antunes has the reputation and the aura of a "cangaceiro" [bandit], of an awesome terrorist, but he is a peaceful man, incapable of taking up a weapon in defense of an idea.

[Soares] "What are you doing these days?"

[Antunes] "Politicking. I don't know how to do anything but politics. I have always been a politician by trade, and at my age, it would be hard to change my profession now."

Carlos Antunes believes in the innocence of Otelo Saraivo de Carvalho.

[Antunes] "What they are accusing him of is not his style. Otelo is not one to get mixed up in anything at such a low level. This would be beneath him. Besides, where is the evidence against Otelo? There are no strong indictments against him. There is no evidence."

Carlos Antunes also questioned the source of some accusations against Otelo.

According to the PRP leader, the operation launched against the FP [Popular Forces-25 April] was a political move which has already backfired on the government. "Just look at the reactions in the national and foreign press. In launching that operation, the government put itself into a hole so deep that it could be harmful and could even be very dangerous for the prisoners themselves."

A True Revolutionary Does Not Destroy Life

We turned the page and left Otelo and the FP-25 behind, but not before Carlos Antunes had denounced the course of action adopted by that organization, the good intentions of its authors notwithstanding. "At this moment, I do not advocate armed struggle to solve the problems of the working classes. In Portugal today, there is still a framework of freedom which must be preserved and developed in the interest of the workers."

Capable of sacrificing his life for an ideal, Carlos Antunes is reluctant to kill for an ideal. "Kill someone? Only in a situation of war or in legitimate defense. Otherwise, no. I do not even carry a weapon. I never have. I learned from Ho Chi-Minh that a true revolutionary does not destroy life. He tries to preserve it."

According to the historic leader of the PRP: "Political activism should be conducted among the masses. Before 25 November 1975, there was a faction of the PRP that advocated armed struggle. Okay. I did not oppose them. They went underground and I stayed in the PRP."

Well, and what future awaits the PRP and the struggle of the proletariat in Portugal at this time and in these circumstances? "It is precisely in Portugal that it is possible to give the power to the workers, to create a truly effective democratic regime, in which the bosses of the past are not replaced by others who do exactly the same thing. At this time, Portugal is experiencing a crisis of historical proportions, which affects all sectors of national life. Of all the countries in Western Europe, ours is the weakest link, or one of the weakest."

Regarding the future, "This is a case where one would say 'Only God knows.' But since we don't believe in God..."

Carlos Antunes acknowledged "the severe organic crisis" which the PRP experienced, particularly after the arrest of its historic leaders. "But we are not timid people. The reactionary forces and the police wanted to destroy us. And we said: 'If they want this, the people do not want it.'"

Today, "there are more of us than there were at the time we were arrested, but we are more discreet. The PRP has no ambition to take over the government and this is not its mission. We do not need to make speeches in order to be heard. The PRP will never hear an echo, except in a revolutionary period. This happened in 1975, and we never once even had access to television."

To stir up dissent in the working masses and to break down the system: this is the tactic adopted by the PRP. "If there were a process of revolutionary disruption in Portugal, believe me, we would be involved. Now, as to the future, I don't know. Give me at least the joy of discovering how the future turns out."

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF FREITAS DO AMARAL'S WITHDRAWAL

Military Candidacy

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 3 Aug 84 p 6

[Article by Rogerio Rodrigues]

[Excerpt] There are many people in the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] who prefer a military candidate for the coming presidential elections, a highly placed CDS source assured O JORNAL. A strong current looks favorably on a military candidacy, perhaps Firmino Miguel.

Thus, contrary to what might be supposed, there was no agitation within the CDS when Freitas do Amaral withdrew his candidacy.

On one hand, the polls were indicating that the model of the voter who would support Freitas do Amaral was farther to the Right than the professor had expected, more to the Right than the regular body of CDS voters; moreover, the launching of a committee to elect the former Centrist leader, formed by CDS members (but functioning independently of the party leadership), failed to create the dynamic leading to the launching, province by province, of other support committees. These two factors weighed seriously in Freitas do Amaral's decision.

Freitas Survey Showed Good Results

Circles very close to Freitas do Amaral dispute, however, that these were the reasons that led to the former CDS leader's withdrawal. They are sure his decision was based on personal reasons and not the results of the polls.

Also according to these circles, the NORMA survey, which was commissioned by Freitas do Amaral himself, was extremely encouraging, showing support extending beyond the usual Centrist constituency. In addition to the CDS, which would vote for him overwhelmingly, the survey revealed that the candidate's support included many fringes of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and, significantly, a fringe of the PS [Socialist Party].

In addition to the personal reasons invoked, a source very close to Freitas do Amaral confided to us that he would not have withdrawn if there had been a clear prospect of victory. To judge from the survey, Freitas do Amaral could have

made it to the second round, but the prospects for election were not too bright. High officials in the CDS confided to us that the decision to withdraw was greeted with some relief, even if the candidate might have come to take more than 30 percent of the vote. "The question was whether the CDS should maintain its ties with Freitas do Amaral any longer," a Centrist source confided to us.

Two Presidential Campaign Theories

Following the withdrawal of a civilian candidate (Freitas do Amaral), two theories are emerging in the CDS. First: that it is necessary to support a military candidate (some prefer Firmino Miguel). Second: the military want to rescue the country for its own sake and not speak for any point of view. The first thesis implies that the CDS is not in a position to support a civilian; the second thesis implies that the party must have a candidate.

But the big question, underlying the theories being aired in the Largo de Caldas, is whether or not it is necessary, or inescapable, to support a strong candidate who is not explicitly put up by the CDS.

This is because, in the view of a CDS leader, 1985 will see the fall of the APU [United People's Alliance] and the central bloc.

We were assured that the CDS will remain virtually silent about the presidential elections until October/November, and sees these elections more in terms of a battle than a victory.

Moreover, the Centrist leaders are convinced that 1985 will be a year of three elections.

Our CDS source asked: "If Mario Soares steps down in October, how will the problem of the government be solved, if not by general elections?" The appointment of a prime minister would have to be the political "nihil obstat" of the president of the republic, according to the constitution.

Popularity Still High

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 3 Aug 84 p 7

[Article by Henrique Monteiro]

[Text] In July, Freitas do Amaral was still the second most mentioned name as the potential winner of the presidential elections. According to a Marktest survey taken in June, which we published in its entirety at the time, the historic leader of the CDS maintained his position, that is, as the "eternal second."

When he was still a member of the AD government, Freitas do Amaral was complaining that he was tired of being in second place. He has continued to occupy this position in all the polls which O JORNAL has been publishing regularly since January, with only two exceptions: in January, Freitas was in third place, following

Lurdes Pintasilgo (always in front) and Mario Soares; the same thing happened in April, a significant month.

Let us look at the ratings achieved by the professor. The lowest point was registered precisely in April, when he received 8 percent, as against 20 percent for Pintasilgo and 13 percent for Mario Soares. February was the high point: 14 percent, as against 18 percent for Pintasilgo. In July it was 13 percent, as against 23 percent for Pintasilgo.

The swing is not large (5 percent), nor could it be considered discouraging, particularly because Freitas do Amaral has been the quietest of those seen as presidential candidates. It is further noted that the NORMA survey commissioned by Freitas do Amaral (although, naturally, on a larger scale) basically coincides with the ones we have been publishing.

Always Defeated in Second Round

In the two straw votes in which Freitas do Amaral's name was included for the second round, the results have always shown that he would probably be defeated. Thus, in March (survey published in April), Freitas received 24 percent of the votes, as against 45 percent for Lurdes Pintasilgo. Oddly enough, the professor received only a little over 50 percent of the votes of the PSD electorate.

In the April survey (published in May), Freitas had 22 percent, as against 37 percent for Mario Soares. The historic leader of the CDS confirmed his "cabalistic" role--to be, in every case, in second place.

A more careful analysis of the breakdown of the results indicates a curious phenomenon: between January and July, Freitas do Amaral increased his percentage in Lisbon and in the south by about as much as it declined in Porto and in the north (about 20 percent). In other words, he appears to have gained "on the outside" and lost ground on "home territory." If we examine his strength in various age groups, we see that he lost only (but substantially) among voters between 35 and 44 years of age. Moreover, the most spectacular gains were observed among the very young (18 to 23 years of age), where he went up 9 percent, and among the elderly (over 55 years of age), where he gained another 7 percent.

Declining Support in CDS

His electoral strength in the major parties, as well as among Eanes supporters, is equally significant. He lost a point to the APU, where he had only 2 percent (which was to be expected); he rose significantly among PS voters and Eanes supporters; he maintained his strength in the PSD; and he declined 14 points in his own party.

This could mean that the CDS no longer sees Freitas do Amaral as its national leader, which has something to do with an effort by the CDS structures and leadership, but it gives the professor reason to complain that, within the party which he founded, there has been no great movement to send him to Belem.

In the July survey, Freitas do Amaral is naturally the figure most supported by the CDS, 47 points higher than the second presidential possibility in the

centrist range, strangely enough, the candidate supported by Eanes. It is also significant that among PSD voters, in July as in January, Freitas do Amaral is--what else?--second, close behind Mota Amaral. However, whereas there were 25 points between the two men in January, now there are only 3 points.

Regarding the popularity of the former CDS leader--and we refer to another of the surveys which we have published regularly--it has not changed significantly either. The peak came in February: 17 percent of the respondents gave Freitas a "very good" or "good" image. The low point was in April (13 percent). In the CDS, in July, Freitas received 59 percent positive responses regarding his popularity, while Lucas Pires remained at 45 percent.

Minority Wing Troubled

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 3 Aug 84 p 10

[Article by Jorge Alves de Oliveira]

[Text] The first effect of Professor Freitas do Amaral's withdrawal of his candidacy for the 1985 presidential elections seems to be an increased number of "unemployed politicians" around his Social Democratic Center Party. Without Freitas do Amaral, the maneuvering room of the members opposed to Lucas Pires was considerably diminished, which led to a radicalization of the positions of some distinguished members of institutes connected to the CDS: the IFPM and the IDL.

Three major factors apparently led to the decision of the CDS founder: first, the lack of strong support in the area of the PSD; second, the absence of the political conditions which would enable him, even if he were defeated, to remain the leader of a broad movement which would encompass the area of the old AD; and third, his location on the voter spectrum as indicated by his survey.

Support from Marcelo

One of the presumed foundations for Freitas do Amaral's candidacy was the support of an important segment of the PSD, which could be led by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and in which men like Luis Fontoura and Rui Almeida Mendes would be vocal. This support--or the conditions to bring it about--did not materialize, so Freitas do Amaral was left with a significant gap among his active supporters.

Nor did Freitas do Amaral's candidacy to occupy Belem imply any guarantee that the CDS founder would, in fact, be elected. Many of his supporters argued that he should run, even if his election was unlikely, since the candidacy would enable him to lay the foundations for a new political movement that would occupy the space of the old AD. At the head of a broad political movement, bringing together all the CDS and a substantial part of the PSD, Freitas do Amaral might not be the next occupant of Belem, but in any case, he would still be the leader of a political force capable of attracting close to 40 percent of the electorate.

PSD and CDS Unified

This theory no longer holds water because of the unity currently revealed in the CDS (with small exceptions) and the difficulty of provoking any deep schism in the PSD at this moment when the Eanist party is preparing to threaten the existing political parties.

The third of the major reasons for Freitas do Amaral's decision to withdraw, as we reported at the time, was the position which the polls assigned to him in the voter spectrum.

He had been convinced for a long time that his political image was more to the center than that of his party and that he would thus have the support of a much larger portion of the electorate. Freitas do Amaral later came to discover that the situation was precisely the opposite--that only the most conservative segments of the electorate would vote for him.

Two Lines Tell It All

"Having considered all the circumstances, I have decided to withdraw my candidacy for the presidential elections in 1985." Everything Freitas do Amaral had to say was contained in these two lines of type. "When I resigned from the CDS, I wrote reams of pages and no one understood me. Perhaps this time, with just two lines, they will understand me better," Freitas do Amaral commented to one of his collaborators and supporters before he announced his decision.

Not everyone accepted the former CDS leaders attitude with good grace. The "pro-Committee in Support" of his candidacy, which had just begun to function in Porto, has already announced that it will not shut down its headquarters "because the harvest is not over until the baskets are washed." This group is apparently willing to try to lay the groundwork for a popular movement to "demand" the candidacy of Freitas do Amaral, which may be what the CDS leader wants. He has, however, clearly indicated that the support he is interested in is not on the shoulders of the support committee, and the others have never said they would back his campaign.

CDS Content

Freitas do Amaral's decision seems to have been some satisfaction to the current CDS leaders. It has been known for a long time that the CDS was not particularly interested in his candidacy; it would much prefer a military figure who could pretend to the status of a national, supra-party candidate. Firmino Miguel would be a good possibility.

The idea that the historic leader of the party could now attempt to return to the presidency of the CDS does not trouble the present leadership. "Freitas do Amaral never enjoyed leading a party; his character is not suited to this position," they told us. Moreover, he would have great trouble winning back the position that he once enjoyed in the CDS. The party has changed quite a bit since the Fifth Congress, and many people will never forgive him for deserting them at a moment of crisis.

Strengthen Positions for the Congress

Meanwhile, one result of Freitas do Amaral's decision was to weaken the position within the party of some of his closest allies, who also belong to the minority wing of the CDS.

Many of these individuals were hoping that when the former CDS president returned to political life, they would regain the status which they had lost in recent times. Now that the picture has changed, they will have to go it alone and find some basis of understanding with Lucas Pires. To found a new party would be unthinkable. The "New Democracy" failed. Their only resort is an understanding with the new leader.

In the CDS, all eyes are now turned to the Sixth Congress, which should take place at the end of November or in early December. Hence it is urgent to strengthen positions before then, to reap dividends at the congress.

Institutes in Jeopardy

This is the most plausible explanation for the agitation which is currently spreading through the CDS and particularly in its institutes. Given that their membership is small, the balance of power within these institutes remains largely favorable to members of the party minority. Lucas Pires could resort to the financial argument, asking the Konrad Adenaur Foundation to suspend its contribution to the funding of the two institutes.

At the moment, however, everything indicates that a compromise solution will be reached before long, perhaps in exchange for some deputy seats or the inclusion of certain names on the "unitarian" slates that will be presented to the congress.

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CSO: 3542/108

MDP BREAKS WITH APU IN VARIOUS LOCALITIES

APU Strength Threatened

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 26 Jul 84 p 10

[Text] The "solid" APU [United People's Alliance] building threatened to collapse, its foundations eroded. The break of the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement] of Braga is only the beginning of a process, which everything indicates is irreversible.

The APU coalition (PCP/MDP [Portuguese Communist Party/MDP]) only functions for electoral events, with the "independence" of the two parliamentary groups then guaranteed, the same thing happening with the local government leaders elected. The only thing is that "fed up with being subjugated," in the name of a coalition, which consisting of two parties and led only by one of them, the PCP, the leaders of the Braga MDP announced the abandonment of the coalition. In other municipalities of Minho, the break is imminent. This divisive symptom worries Lisbon leaders, who went to Braga and other municipalities of Minho this weekend to hear the reasons from local leaders and to take a position. According to Secretary General Mario Casquilho "It is a matter of a local problem and a radicalized attitude," by some of his fellow party members. Mario Casquilho believes, however, that "there are operational problems in the APU," although he concluded that the "coalition should proceed without prejudice to improvements in its operations."

However, national MDP leaders fear that the movement of emancipation begun in Braga will be followed by the different regional leaderships, it being known that in addition to the problems in Minho, there are also serious differences in the districts of Setubal, Evora and Faro. If Lisbon cannot manage to put a halt to this "movement," the days of the APU are counted.

MDP Members Interviewed

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 20 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Jose Gomes Bandeira: "PCP Political Style Neutralizes Effectiveness of the APU"]

[Text] Braga, Famalicao and Guimaraes: the APU [United People's Alliance] is in crisis in all these important localities of Minho. In Braga, the break

made public by the MDP this week already appears to be irreversible, at least until the holding of new local government elections. In Guimaraes there are great difficulties in agreeing on points of view between the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] and the MDP for a unified and harmonious activity. In Famalicao, the case is similarly grave: those elected from the two parties, although in the same coalition (APU), vote for their own side in the Municipal Assembly where they have five elected members (2 from the MDP and 3 from the PCP).

For the Braga MDP leaders, with whom we spoke for some hours, this is due to the "political style" of the PCP which, they add, "locally neutralizes the effectiveness of the APU itself." Those officials of the Braga MDP, cooperative leader Jose Manuel Barbosa and Jose Aldeira, also told us that the MDP "clearly assumes this position," adopted unanimously, and that they did not want to "evade the problems any longer."

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Since the break with the APU was a unanimous decision of the Braga MDP there is nothing to be done. How did this come about?

MDP: This process began to go badly in the local elections of 1982 due more to relations with the officials of the PCP than with communist party members. There was difficulty in making up the slates, with the PCP wanting to remove names and raising objections to even the inclusion of a prestigious figure linked to the MDP, Engineer Pinheiro Braga, to head the slate of the APU. Later, those difficulties in relationship were confirmed in practice. If the person elected is from the PCP, he only reports to the PCP and not to the APU. Here in Braga we have viewed this in a more liberal manner, so to speak, but in Guimaraes and Famalicao relations are worse.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Will you seek to remedy this situation within the coalition?

MDP: There was talk of that with members of the PCP even in meetings, but later things did not improve. We reached the point where we learned from the PS [Socialist Party] of meetings that the PCP had with the Socialists. There also appeared documents of the APU in which the MDP was not consulted and later the communists apologized saying "it is something done only by our elected members..." The truth is that we do not confuse the local government positions with the positions of the Workers Committee of the Municipal Chamber.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: The PC accuses you of not attending meetings. Is that true?

MDP: For now there have been meetings of which we were not notified or we learned of them later from the newspapers. On the other hand, there is no fixed schedule. Whenever the meetings are coordinated with everybody we are not absent. But that is not the important thing...

DIARIO DE LISBOA: The important thing is, then, the positions of the two parties toward problems.

MDP: The MDP Congress itself has already discussed that. We, not only those of Braga but also from other zones, particularly Santarem, Setubal, Viana do Castelo, Faro and Evora, were defeated. But now, when the political situation becomes acute and there is a new movement with the possibility of new parties and with elections, we believe that we should not remain tied to the positions of the Congress.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Is that on a local level, at the level of local government politics?

MDP: It is at that level that our problems appear here in the APU. We have agreed on actions with respect to certain specific problems such as the case of Mesquita Machana, in which the MDP was the driving force in the problem. Moreover, the two independents on the APU slate (Drs Tarroso Gomes and Barreto Nunes), men of prestige, have had a moderating effect. The problem, above all, is the actions and methods of participation. In Guimaraes and Famalicao those elected from the PCP and the MDP vote in a different way. We always advocate that the coalition must be above the strict logic of the two parties and that was never achieved. The PCP is much more in favor of great involvement in national problems and we advocate involvement in local situations. The MDP is capable here of making all the people, all the parties, sit at the same table and the PCP does not have that capability and that flexibility.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Is it only a sort of relationship with persons?

MDP: It is everything; it is the way of acting, the language, the procedures. The PCP only acts with its heirarchic structure present and that does not allow relationships to be in keeping with situations. We are always clashing here with the concept of political work of the PCP. All of us in the MDP have our professions, but we are capable of liaison with the other forces to try to resolve things without placing the strictly party component above everything else.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Basically you refer to the concept you have of political participation...

MDP: That is correct. It is the political style of the PCP. We believe that it even compromises the effectiveness of the coalition. There are obstacles to the handling of problems and those independently elected must already be considering whether they will accept a new candidacy or not.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: They told me in Famalicao that the PCP is obtaining advantages from your definitive withdrawal from the APU, at least here in Braga.

MDP: We have many doubts. But it is true that with the lack of definition that the last MDP Congress was held, there may be the danger that the MDP will be dissolved in some zones. Here in Braga, the MDP has a traditional value and prestigious members. We believe that we are going to take many votes from the PCP. Where the MDP is completely confused with the PCP, the MDP is practically inactive. That is not what is happening in our district.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Did that confusion distort the image of the MDP? Is that right?

MDP: Yes. That image can only be recovered with a great effort and that effort is possible.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Do you mean to say that there will never be an APU in Braga again?

MDP: Until the end of the legislature our elected members will participate with the MDP and not as APU. Later we shall see. However, the road has not been made any easier for another coalition.

DIARIO DE LISBOA: Are you also confused with the PCP?

MDP: No. Parties and persons in Braga distinguish between our ideas and daily work and those of the PCP.

Outlying Areas Importance Weighed

Lisbon EXPRESS in Portuguese 21 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by J.P. : "Revolt of the Outlying Regions"]

[Text] The Braga District MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] broke with the APU. Signs of the same dissatisfaction and differences which led to the break are germinating in four other districts: Faro, Evora, Setubal and Viana do Castelo.

It is from the outlying areas, the same areas which the embryonic Eanist party view as an important factor, that the controversy comes.

Certainly it is not a restatement of the old Maoist theory of the city being surrounded by the rural area. However, it appears obvious that the outlying area, with all that the expression contains of ambiguity, begins to assume an important role in Portugal, in good part based on a generalized disenchantment with the political class which makes a spectacle of itself in the capital.

The MDP is a small party, which the oppressive nature of the PCP reduced to a mere useful appendage. At least that is its public image, which the Congress of last June did not help to dispel.

Santos Simoes of Braga said to EXPRESSO on the subject: "Possibly the MDP lost in its congress the last, or one of the last, chances to affirm itself as an independent party."

And this is the important question which led to the break: The PCP treats its coalition partner in the APU as a party which only exists for external consumption. At the level of the APU in the countryside, it ignores it in decision making, in the proposals it presents in the name of the APU, in daily practice.

If the MDP leaders installed in Lisbon feign to be unaware of this problem, comforted by an angelic parliamentary independence, the members and supporters of the countryside see themselves daily confronted by the overwhelming weight of the PCP apparatus.

It is in the outlying areas, also, that exist the more vigorous methods of work and the cultural values which formed the old CDE's in which the MDP has its roots.

The "uprising" of Braga thus appears logical. And if the "message" contained in it is not clearly understood by the leaders in Lisbon, it could signal the beginning of the end for the MDP as a party which is at least formally independent.

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CSO: 3542/88

POLL SHOWS EANES POPULARITY REMAINS CONSTANT

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 20-26 Jul 84 p 13

[Article by J.S.P.: "Branches of Power: Only Eanes Does Not Decline"]

[Text] Among the three best known branches of power, only the president of the republic did not see his image degraded before public opinion, contrary to what happened with the government and parliament.

According to figures collected within the framework of the Marktest/O JORNAL poll, recorded throughout the first half of 1984, the government, among those entities, is the one whose image has suffered the greatest erosion, holding the unenviable position of the branch of power with the least support among the voters.

Since the beginning of the year, the good image of the Executive Branch has been declining progressively to a point that in June only four percent of the electorate judged the work of the government favorably, compared to nine percent in January.

With respect to a "bad image," the Assembly of the Republic, however, managed to achieve a less adverse standing during the course of the 6 months evaluated, the decline being less than that of the Executive Branch, 6 points (43 to 37).

The results of the poll show, however, that the good image of the president of the republic is particularly expressed by the voters of the PS [Socialist Party] and the APU [United People's Alliance] (40 percent of the respective voters), with smaller sectors of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and the PDS [Social Democratic Party] (17 percent and 11 percent, respectively) expressing themselves on the subject.

With respect to the "bad image" of the president, there is a clearer indication among CDS voters (34 percent) and those of the PSD (23 percent), than among the supporters of the APU (8 percent) or the PS (4 percent).

As for the government, its impopularity is, as was to be expected, strongly indicated by the voters of the APU (87 percent), but it is also clear among those who say they vote for the PSD (50 percent), CDS (44 percent) or PS (39 percent).

	President						Government						Parliament					
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	F	M	A	M	J
Good Image	32	33	30	27	27	27	9	8	7	5	5	4	5	6	6	5	5	5
Bad Image	16	16	15	12	13	13	40	48	51	45	46	51	37	42	41	36	39	43

Technical Index

The present study is representative of the population of the mainland who are eligible to vote (+18 years) and live in localities of more than 10,000 inhabitants.

Five hundred two persons were interviewed in 16 localities in the week between 8 and 15 June.

The selection of individuals to be interviewed was made by the selection of quotas, using such variables of control as sex, age and region.

Extrapolation of results overall was made with consideration of the influence of each region.

Treatment of the results was through the use of the changing average over the last 2 months, which means that the values of February are the result of the January/February average; the values for March are the average of the February/March values, and so forth. Through this method it is sought to correct possible aberrations and give a greater consistency to the results.

The maximum error in the total sample is 4.5 percent (probability of 95 percent).

The journalistic treatment of the results is the responsibility of O JORNAL.

8908

CSO: 3542/88

DUARTE INCIDENT SEEN MIRRORING POOR EANES IMAGE

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 24 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice: "The President's Sulk"]

[Excerpt] An incident took place upon the arrival in Lisbon of El Salvador President Napoleon Duarte. As is known, Mr Duarte, probably confident because of his friendship with the great of this world, committed an act of complete diplomatic discourtesy when he made a speech to the press filled with praise for Mario Soares (who he called President Soares in the South American manner), without a protocolary word, not even the slightest, for General Eanes who was at his side. Portugal is not a banana republic and for that reason such an action should not be allowed to go uncriticized, something which I do with the naturalness of someone who does not harbor any sort of private sympathy or political solidarity with the present president of the republic. However, the president of Portugal is the highest institutional figure of the Portuguese State, subject to criticism as any other politician but no Portuguese can accept that he be grossly slighted on the level of international relations.

It is not, however, the president of El Salvador who interests me and it is not about the flawed actions--supposing they are that--of that gentleman that I wish to speak about here. It is about the unbelievable reaction by Ramalho Eanes that I intend to write and it is that attitude which I consider to be the flawed action about which I began to write about at the beginning of this story. As is also known, the president of the Republic of Portugal, confronted with the total lack of reference to his person by Duarte and probably annoyed erroneously by the phrase "President Soares," found no better solution than that of leaving the place he occupied, place which was compatible with his status as president of a host country, in the middle of the speech, to go into the midst of the media professionals there present.

This reaction is in several aspects unbelievable. It is, in the first place, symptomatic of political immaturity, which is strange after 8 years of the presidency and diplomatic contacts. The president of the republic of a civilized country reacts through diplomatic notes, he reacts by means of political statements, he even reacts by declaring that Mr Duarte has become "persona non grata" in Portugal, but he does not sulk, he does not leave his post.

In the second place, this reaction denotes a high degree of inability to accept any criticism because he shows a complete lack of acceptance of a discourtesy. Political life, like social life, is filled with incidents of this type. Because of this reaction, it may be foreseen that tomorrow General Eanes, secretary general of the party of the same name, will leave the television studio whenever he is attacked, he will leave the plenary session of the Assembly of the Republic when his name is not the object of praise, he will leave his own party if a Silva Pinto were to forget to praise him.

In the third place, this reaction reveals that President Eanes has generated within himself a sort of phobia of visceral aversion to Mario Soares. No one has any doubt about the strong personal conflict between the two politicians, just as no one has any doubts about the similar conflict with Sa Carneiro. No one, therefore, could think that the highest figure of the State could act publicly in such a fashion just because a foreign personality praised his adversary extravagantly, adversary who is the second highest figure of the Portuguese State (or the third if one does not discount Tito de Morais...). In politics, anger is a poor counselor, particularly when it is expressed through someone who does not have sufficient presence of mind to think for a second before acting.

In a country such as the United States, a reaction of this type would surely cost the performer his political future. Among us it is probable that it will serve as the basis for fulsome praise because it is usual to confuse political firmness and clarity with bad manners, shouts or unthinking reaction. This man who sulks in public is the Portuguese president and he seeks to be the future prime minister because he is preparing to create a party, the expression of his plan for personal power. In democracy we are responsible for our own actions, particularly when the irresponsibility of certain acts does not evoke in us any perception of what they mean.

8908

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MILITARY PROMOTIONS, NEW APPOINTMENTS LISTED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 19 Jul 84 p 18

[Article by F.A.: "Uncertainties Overcome, Rotations"]

[Except] Rotations

With the coming of the holidays, the main changes in military commands are beginning to take shape, whether they be at the levels of units or even in the military regions, at the same time that there is talk of promotions to the highest ranks, specifically to brigadier and general. The respective meetings of the councils established for evaluating the possible candidates have already been scheduled.

With respect to military posts, the most significant changes have taken place, and will continue to be processed, among the brigadiers. In the positions to which generals are assigned, there are only those of the inspector general of the army (vacant since the recent assignment to the reserves of General Ramires de Oliveira) and that of commander of the Lisbon Military Region, where General Artur Beirao (who will go into the reserves in September) will be replaced by General Ricardo Durao, now very much in the limelight because of his status as a former Olympic athlete.

Other also significant changes should take place in the command of the Azores Military Zone (where Brigadier Cabral Couto will be replaced by Brigadier Oliveira Carvalho) and in the command of the Cavalry Arm (in which the replacement for Gen Ricardo Durao may be Brigadier Carlos Azeredo).

Meanwhile, Brigadier Pereira Coutinho has already assumed the position of director of the Military Judicial Police, while Brigadier Gomes do Amaral should shortly assume the post of director of the Service of Justice and Discipline, leaving vacant the post of deputy commander of the Southern Military Region, to which Brigadier Verissimo Baptista will be appointed. Brigadier Francisco Cabral Couto will command the First Independent Mixed Brigade, replacing Brigadier Garrett de Castro, whose future functions will be in the office of the Inspector General of the Army together with Brigadier Abel Cabral Couto when the latter returns from the Azores. Brigadier Artur Seixas, until a short time ago the military attache in Paris, will be director of the Physical Education Service. Brigadier Lemos Pires, outgoing director, will be the future deputy

director of the IAEM [Institute of Advanced Military Studies], post which has already been vacated by Rocha Vieira, who has already gone to the National Defense Institute, also as deputy director.

Brigadier Goncalves de Passos, up to now the deputy commander of the Central Military Region, will take over the command of the Army Corps (operational basic structure for reorganization under the Lisbon Military Region). He will be replaced in the Central Military Region by Brigadier Perry da Camara, director of the Military College, position which will be filled by Brigadier Valente of the air force.

With respect to the Light Airborne Brigade (unit recently created from the forces of the Commandos Regiment, with armored and artillery support, and which will be used in the coming national exercises), its future commander will be Brigadier Fausto Marques of the army general staff.

Also recently appointed to posts abroad are Colonels Albuquerque Nogueira (to military attache in Washington) and Martins dos Reis (to military attache in Paris).

8908

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THREATENING DELAYS IN DEFENSE LAW

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 14 Jul 84 p 10

[Text] The armed forces have been waiting a year and a half for the publication of the complementary legislation required by the December 1982 National Defense Law.

Essentially, it is a matter of important documents. In this category are the National Defense Strategic Concept, the Code of Military Justice, the Regulations on Military Discipline, the Conscientious Objector Statute, the Statute of Military Status and the Laws on Military Programming.

All these documents should have been published by the end of 1983, or if the final period of the last administration of Francisco Balsemao is discounted, by June of 1984.

It is true that with respect to the Code of Military Justice, the Regulations on Military Discipline or the Statute of Military Status, there is nothing to be expected except editing or the compilation or systematization of legislation now available. However, it is no less true that no matter how much joint planning is invoked, the armed forces will not be able to embark on the trail of their reorganization as long as they do not know the National Defense Strategic Concept.

These are documents within the exclusive purview of the Assembly of the Republic but in this respect the fault does not appear to lie completely in S. Bento. There are dozens of decrees and directives pertaining to the military which are being delayed or stopped in the complicated labyrinths of the ministries.

For all of them the military structures have done their part in the process in the necessary time and period. The responsibilities for the delays noted are therefore entirely those of the agents of political power.

A situation of this type causes harm, demoralization and steals confidence. At the same time it places military commanders in the difficult position of feeling that they are being squeezed between the lack of response of the politicians and the perplexity and impatience of the organizations they command.

Moreover, in this fashion there is created and offered an excellent pretext for those who may be interested in seeking to cultivate among the armed forces a nostalgia for the Council of the Revolution and for the times in which the military men were not subject to these types of delays and neglect.

8908

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NEW AIRCRAFT TO BE RECEIVED FROM U.S.

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 10 Jul 84 p 2

[Text] The Portuguese Air Force should receive two squadrons of F-20 interceptor aircraft within the framework of the military compensation contained in recent agreements with the United States.

The F-20's, aircraft with characteristics more adapted to national conditions than their F-16 or F-18 counterparts and, therefore, less costly, will allow the FAP [Portuguese Air Force] to carry out its principal mission in a more suitable manner, that is, the defense of national air and maritime space.

The FAP, which due to its involvement in the war in Africa and the difficult economic situation of the country, has scant means for facing a possible threat (situation which extends to the two other branches of the armed forces), and does not yet have aircraft for interception, has been using A-7 fighters for this mission. The A-7 is designed for attacking targets on the ocean surface.

Interception is considered a first priority by the air force, an official source having told A TARDE that its effective realization within the framework of national potential would at least partially stave off "foreign temptations relative to missions whose accomplishment is within the purview of Portuguese institutions."

The capabilities of the FAP, it was also learned by A TARDE, will also be strengthened by a new squadron of A-7's to be delivered by the United States, also within the framework of military compensation for the facilities it has available in the Azores. The 20 A-7 aircraft which the FAP has, were almost all immobilized a short while ago due to the detection of a malfunction in the engine in one of the aircraft, which forced an overall inspection and the shipment of parts to the factory in the United States. At this time, it was learned by A TARDE from a military source, half are already in an operational status. The A-7's are also being used by the air forces of the United States and Greece and they are equipped, it was emphasized to our newspaper, with modern avionics equipment.

For targets on the ground, the FAP has some FIAT aircraft provided by the FRG.

P-3 Orion and C-130

In the line of development and modernization which has been followed, and within the framework of the optimization of resources, the military source previously mentioned also told our newspaper that the FAP also seeks to obtain P-3 Orion aircraft for antisubmarine patrol and some C-130 transport aircraft of a type that will allow an increase in traditional capacity.

Radar

Finally, A TARDE learned that NATO should make a decision by the end of this year on a plan aimed at the installation of three new aerial surveillance radars in our country.

According to the sources consulted by our newspaper, there are indications that the plan was well accepted by the allies, who will also benefit from the new structures to be installed in Foia, Montejunto and the Pilar mountains.

8908

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DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZATION EFFORTS IN MILITARY

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 19 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Eduardo Mascarenhas: "New Mixed Brigade Emerges in Army Structures"]

[Excerpt] The armed forces, despite the delay by Assembly of the Republic in approving the Military Programing Law, continue to make an effort in the development and modernization of its human and material resources, achieving, as A TARDE stated, a high military rating, the international credibility which allows the effective performance of their missions.

On the material plane, that effort is made through the acquisition of new material. The air force, as A TARDE already reported, expects to receive F-20 aircraft soon. The navy continues to fight for new frigates. Finally, the army reorganizes its human resources and materials and advances in the creation of a new brigade...

The creation of a second brigade, which shall be "light, small and airborne," emerges as a result of the need for an increase in the operational component of the army.

In an internally circulated document distributed by the office of the chief of staff of the army to several units and departments, and to which our newspaper had access, it is emphasized that General Salazar Braga believes it "to be ridiculous" that the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade continues to be presented as the only and exclusive result of the effort to increase the operational component of the army.

"That is the reason," states the document distributed by the office of the chief of staff of the army, "for the need to merge operational requirements with a view to the organization of new large units, even if they are deficiently equipped because of a lack of sophisticated equipment."

The document says: "It was therefore decided to create a second brigade that will be light, small and airborne, with the specific viewpoint of fast reinforcement, particularly of the archipelagos."

The new brigade, as we also learned, would be commanded by Brigadier Fausto Perreira Marques. The maneuvering elements of the new unit will be the existing Commando Battalions and the Squadron of the Army Cavalry Regiment (Estremoz), which is under the direct orders of the chief of staff of the army. The Serra do Pilar Artillery Regiment (RASP), in Porto, will provide fire support. Support services will be initially obtained from the Commando Regiment Headquarters.

The new brigade, according to the document to which we had access, will be tested in Exercise "Orion 84."

"Orion 83" Showed Difficulties in Coordination

The same document adds that "it is the intention" of the chief of staff of the army to proceed to another reorganization soon, with the appointment of Brigadier Raul Goncalves Ramos "So that as part of the Lisbon Region Military Command he can devote himself primarily and permanently to the performance of tasks linked to planning of the ground defense of national territory."

This is because General Salazar Braga believes that Exercise "Orion 83" showed that the military governor of Lisbon had permanent difficulties in coordinating his responsibilities as territorial commander and tactical commander, particularly during the preparation of national exercises.

Pursuant to the System of Forces approved in April this year, there exists "in the order of battle" an army corps command for the military governor of Lisbon.

8908

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PETROLEUM EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY SPARKS UNDERWATER CONSTRUCTION

COMEX Order Book Full

Paris LES ECHOS in French 4 Jul 84 p 8

[Article by Didier Duruy]

[Text] Activity in the petroleum equipment industry is not as dismal as some companies' earnings might suggest. The COMEX [Maritime Appraisal Company] group is counting on an increase in its sales revenue of about 30 percent this year. And it doesn't even work in the United States.

This dynamism has been boosted by a \$40 million contract with Saudi Arabia, proof that "investments are moving again in the Persian Gulf."

For COMEX, this operation on behalf of Aramco is of some interest, as it constitutes a transfer to this region of the sophisticated technologies used in the North Sea. (It is to build and install a larger number of underwater connections).

The work, which will go on for 18 months, will push COMEX's sales in this area up to 200 million francs this year, as much as in Brazil, and a little less than in Southeast Asia (250 million francs).

The company's favored terrain is still the North Sea, though. While this region provided a good third of its total activity last year, in 1984 COMEX expects half of its earnings of 1.3 billion francs to come from the North Sea area.

It is in this hostile region that the technology of the Marseilles-based firm has found its best expression, even though it has to contend there with the nationalism of local governments. Brazil, where this summer a well head will be placed at a depth of over 400 meters, is arousing more and more excitement on the part of the company's engineers.

High-tech work has become essential because of the low profit margin in more traditional areas. This is not a recent trend: COMEX's activity in the early 1970s was 80 percent in drilling. Today its drilling work amounts to only 7 percent. It has been replaced by underwater construction engineering, a specialty in which the group holds 30 percent of the world market.

At the same time, the firm has also become a shipowner, and now operates five ships ("our plants") in the North Sea. This was a major undertaking, which last year required 180 million in investments, while the company's cash flow was in the vicinity of 100 million francs.

This imbalance could cause some problems. As is often the case in French businesses, COMEX lacks its own equity capital. A number of possibilities have been considered: the offering of shares on the Stock Exchange, or support from specialized financing organizations.

These proposals have been turned down and Mr Delauze, who owns 65 percent of the capital, is looking for investors. Outside of France, it seems. No matter what may happen, he intends to keep control of this company he founded in 1961 with 50,000 francs.

The group's very serious problems in 1979 have now been forgotten.

Alsthom Diving Equipment

Paris LES ECHOS in French 4 Jul 84 p 8

[Text] ATCB [Brittany Laboratory and Construction Facilities] (Alsthom-Atlantique) has just received three orders for deep diving equipment. Contracts with a total value of 150 million francs have been signed with India, Great Britain, and Japan. This success follows the agreement reached between COMEX and Alsthom about ATCB's pursuit of the commercial and industrial development of equipment used in very deep underwater activities.

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ELF-AQUITAINE OFFICIAL DECRIES EXCESSIVE DIVERSIFICATION

Fine vs. Basic Chemicals

Paris LES ECHOS in French 27 Jun 84 p 8

[Article by Didier Duruy]

[Text] The diversifications attempted by the oil companies have been "a total failure." There is no lack of examples to support this claim, made yesterday by Gilbert Rutman during a seminar at the energy geopolitics center, directed by Andre Giraud. It was surprising, though, to hear Elf-Aquitaine's vice president include chemicals among these diversification activities.

Gilbert Rutman has observed "an accelerated withdrawal" by these companies out of the field of chemicals, at the very time when his own group is just beginning to digest the upturn in assets at Rhone-Poulenc and PCUK.

In his opinion, intended to be a general view, he added that basic chemicals would tend to be reserved for countries with available raw materials; he said that the necessary shift toward fine chemicals would provide "another line of work."

Does this mean that the Elf management now regrets Albin Chalandon's initiative, which his successor endorsed immediately after joining the group? Just a few days ago, though, Michel Pecqueur seemed fairly well pleased with the first results of this new branch, though still remaining cautious.

The curtailing of expensive diversifications is only one of the strategic disciplinary programs companies are now imposing on themselves. They are also finding it necessary to increase their exploration activity, but selectively; to detach input from output; to pull back somewhat from refining, in an orderly manner; and finally, to pay more attention to commercial activities.

With regard to commercial activities, this is just as applicable to distribution as it is to crude petroleum. "We have to devise

new distribution methods," feels Rutman. In dealing with crude, this has become inevitable, for there is no longer any equivalence between the companies' resources and needs. And at Elf, this rule has become total, since the group no longer refines any crude that it produces.

Gilbert Rutman did not speak as a strong advocate of the financial concentrations that have taken place in the petroleum industry in the United States. In such cases, the companies acquired have often been in worse shape than expected. This leads us to wonder if, with the appearance of some financial difficulties, Elf may not be rethinking the strategy introduced by its former president, Albin Chalandon.

Or perhaps this may simply be a visible manifestation of the ongoing struggle between Elf and the government on the price of electricity used for producing chlorine and on the future of the French refining industry.

Industry Stance Clarified

Paris LES ECHOS in French 28 Jun 84 p 4

[Text] After the article we published yesterday [first part of this translation] on the strategy pursued by the oil companies in general and by Elf-Aquitaine in particular, Elf's vice president, Gilbert Rutman, offered the following clarification: "In speaking of* the involvement of the petroleum industry as a whole in chemicals, I meant to point out that a shift in interest has been going on and would continue, away from basic chemicals toward fine chemicals and specialized chemicals, and that new developments in basic chemistry, related to ammonia, methanol, and ethylene, would tend to be confined to countries that could provide the raw materials (gas, ethane, etc.) at good prices."

"This objective observation was meant to imply no conclusions about a withdrawal by the SNEA [expansion unknown] from this sector in which our group, on the contrary, has actually begun to increase its activities, particularly in the area of petrochemicals and basic chemicals, and which may already be showing the first positive results from its activities."

* During a colloquium sponsored by Andre Giraud on "Strategic Orientations of the Petroleum Industry."

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